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GLOSSARY 
The annual data requirement (ADR) is a list of all requests for data made to all police 
forces in England and Wales under the Home Secretary's statutory powers and is used to 
report crime and policing related statistics. 
Call-handlers or Police Communications Officers answer 999 emergency calls, deploy 
relevant resources to the location of the incident, liaise with police officers and provide 
additional information where necessary.  
Central Referral Unit (CRU) is a multi-agency information sharing structure, typically 
comprised of police and social care but other partner agency representatives may also be 
involved.  
Child Abduction Warning Notices (CAWNs) Child Abduction Warning Notices were 
formerly known as Harbourers’ Warnings. They can be issued against individuals who are 
suspected of grooming children by stating that they have no permission to associate with the 
named child and that if they do so they can be arrested under the Child Abduction Act 1984 
and Children Act 1989. 
Child Protection and Abuse Investigation (CPAI) is a specific crime and policing working 
group within the National Police Chiefs’ Council that seeks to assist and coordinate the 
delivery of operational activity in this area.  
Child sexual abuse involves forcing or enticing a child or young person to take part in 
sexual activities, not necessarily involving a high level of violence, whether or not the child is 
aware of what is happening. The activities may involve physical contact, including assault by 
penetration (for example, rape or oral sex) or non-penetrative acts such as masturbation, 
kissing, rubbing and touching outside of clothing. They may also include non-contact 
activities, such as involving children in looking at, or in the production of, sexual images, 
watching sexual activities, encouraging children to behave in sexually inappropriate ways, or 
grooming a child in preparation for abuse (including via the internet). Sexual abuse is not 
solely perpetrated by adult males. Women can also commit acts of sexual abuse, as can 
other children (DfE, 2015; p. 5).  
 
Child sexual exploitation is a form of child sexual abuse. It occurs where an individual or 
group takes advantage of an imbalance of power to coerce, manipulate or deceive a child or 
young person under the age of 18 into sexual activity (a) in exchange for something the 
victim needs or wants, and/or (b) for the financial advantage or increased status of the 
perpetrator or facilitator. The victim may have been sexually exploited even if the sexual 
activity appears consensual. Child sexual exploitation does not always involve physical 
contact; it can also occur through the use of technology (DfE, 2017; p. 93).  
 
Contact offences are sexual offences involving direct physical contact between the victim 
and perpetrator.  
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is the principal prosecuting authority for England 
and Wales, acting independently in criminal cases investigated by the police and others. 
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Frontline officers are operational officers who work reactively to crime in the community. 
These include Police Community Support Officers (PCSO) who work with police officers and 
share some, but not all, of their powers.  
Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC) is a local, multi-agency victim-
focused meeting where information on the highest risk cases of domestic violence and 
abuse is shared between different statutory and voluntary sector agencies.  
 
Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH) aim to improve the safeguarding response for 
children and vulnerable adults through better information sharing and high quality and 
timely safeguarding responses. 
The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) brings police forces in the UK together to 
help police coordinate operations, reform, improve and provide value for money. 
Non-contact offences are sexual offences that do not involve direct physical contact 
between the victim and perpetrator. An example of this would include inciting a child to 
engage in sexual activity over the internet.  
Problem profile is a police intelligence product created to provide detail on crime trends or 
hot spots, provide a focus for analytic assessment, assist in victim and perpetrator 
identification, assist in prioritising operational work, identify intelligence gaps, highlight 
opportunities for prevention and enforcement and provide justification for actions.  
Rape and Serious Sexual Offences (RASSO) unit is a specialist unit within the CPS, 
staffed by specially trained lawyers and paralegal officers. The unit offers specialist legal 
advice, decision making and support to victims. It works closely with a number of other 
organisations, including the police, to improve the service that is offered to the victims of 
rape, child sexual abuse and all other serious sexual offences. 
Safer Neighbourhood Teams consist of officers and Police Community Support Officers 
(PCSOs) dedicated to specific neighbourhoods.   
Third-party material refers to evidential materials held by third parties that can help 
to corroborate evidence to support or disprove an allegation. This can include observations 
by carers relating to changes in the victim’s behaviour or evidence of grooming (eg, 
receiving gifts) but can also come from other sources, eg, 999 tapes, house-to-house 
enquiries or photographs. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Background  
This research, carried out between 2015 and 2017 was undertaken by a team at the 
International Centre: Researching child sexual exploitation, trafficking and violence at the 
University of Bedfordshire. The International Centre has an established reputation for child-
centred research and recently completed an initiative joint funded by the Home Office, 
Higher Education Funding Council for England and College of Policing to improve and share 
learning on policing child sexual exploitation (CSE) (see website 
https://www.uobcsepolicinghub.org.uk/).   
The original overarching aim of this research project was “to improve multi-agency work with 
police to prevent child sexual exploitation”. It was funded by KPMG Foundation and Norfolk 
Constabulary, supported by The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) Lead for Child 
Protection and Abuse Investigation.  
This research is the first study of its kind. It is the first to document examples of current 
operating models of police responses to CSE in England and Wales; the first to attempt to 
draw out summaries of how features of policing improve disruption and prosecution of 
offenders; and the first study to assess the features of CSE policing responses in relation to 
the outcomes for victims. The research involved interviewing police officers and civilian staff 
including researchers and analysts from CSE teams across eight selected study forces in 
England.   
The headings below highlight the key findings from this research.     
1. There is limited knowledge about ‘what works’ in policing 
CSE  
1.1 Our searches for literature yielded no studies that have aimed to document models for 
policing responses to CSE; even inspection reports provide little insight into how CSE 
responses are structured. Published research about ‘what works’ in policing to obtain 
CSE prosecutions is also absent.  
1.2 Understanding the relationship between policing responses and prosecutions remains 
elusive in light of problematic data recording within the police.   
1.3 There is a gap between the current policy definition of CSE and the Sexual Offences 
legislation, which impacts on the nature and extent of data collected on CSE.  
2. Data sources and complexities resulting from the lack of 
uniform, consistent data  
2.1 Disruption and prosecution data at individual police force level is not readily available.  
2.2 The Home Office annual data requirement (ADR) is, for the first time, requiring forces 
to submit data on ‘CSE flagged’ incidents and crimes, which will be available in the 
2017/2018 ADR. CSE ‘flagging’ is now considered to be an important component of an 
effective response to CSE, although practices remain inconsistent both within and 
across forces. 
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2.3 Records from the eight police forces studied in this research show a range from 0.9 
CSE-related offences per 100,000 population to 38 per 100,000. The average number 
of CSE-related offences is 11 per 100,000 population while the median is 8. That data 
is likely to be unreliable however, and should be treated with caution. 
2.4 Qualitative interviews with police in CSE teams reveal that they are unaware of the 
scale of successful CSE prosecutions because of the problematic nature of the data. 
2.5 It is recognised across the field that the problems faced by practitioners in recording 
data have an adverse impact on the capacity of police and researchers to portray an 
accurate picture of what is happening on the ground. Information of the kind sought in 
this research will be largely unachievable until substantial strides are made in data 
recording practices across the criminal justice system. 
3. Models of CSE policing responses  
3.1 This research set out to improve multi-agency policing to prevent CSE. To do this, 
different ‘models’ of policing were identified and have been represented visually. 
Further research is required to fill a gap in knowledge about the range of outcomes 
that can be achieved through police intervention and which outcomes are most critical 
for young people.  
3.2 We identified four different ‘Model structures’ for policing CSE within the eight forces 
studied.  
3.3 We do not know how representative these models are across England and Wales, but 
we hope that the models may serve as a useful reference point for forces to assess 
their own response holistically in light of the findings contained within this report.  
Model structure: Four different models for supporting victims of CSE were 
established 
 
3.4 Model 1 – Integrated specialist CSE teams. In this model, victim support is integrated 
with investigative functions. The model depicts a CSE response that can best be 
described as a single, specialised unit that holds force responsibility for CSE 
investigation, disruption and supporting young people. Five forces complied with this 
model, with three variations in how it is implemented.  
3.5 Model 2 – Victim-focused specialist CSE team. In this model, victim support is 
separate from investigative and disruption work. One of the eight forces in this study 
complied with this model. The CSE team in this model provides the link from the police 
contact with the victim to the investigation teams.  
3.6 Model 3 – Intelligence-focused specialist CSE team with dispersed victim support. 
Investigations and victim support occur across existing policing structures rather than 
within a specialised CSE structure. To that effect, this model promotes an omni-
competent police force with victim support carried out by all police (alongside multi-
agency partners) where appropriate. One of the eight forces in this study complied 
with this model. The CSE team is responsible for analytic capability, awareness-
raising, chairing multi-agency CSE meetings and tasking disruption activity.  
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3.7 Model 4 – No specialist CSE team with dispersed victim support. One of the eight 
forces in this study complied with this model; this force has no named ‘specialist CSE 
unit’ and also promotes an omni-competent police force. The CSE response, including 
support of victims, is dispersed throughout regional Safeguarding Units.  
General themes of effective features of models:  
3.8 Inspection results were more positive where there was    
 A good understanding of the CSE threat (via problem profiles). 
 Strong police leadership of the management of CSE cases.  
 An ‘omni-competent’ police force, with specialist CSE analytical capability.   
 Sufficient funding for resource-intensive policing work such as disruption and 
evidence-gathering. 
 A specialist (usually voluntary sector) CSE service to undertake victim-based work in 
partnership with police.  
 Good communication between staff members in different teams within the force and 
between the force and external partner agencies. 
 Active and proactive multi-agency collaboration between police and partner 
agencies.   
Influencing factors on the development of models   
3.9 The size of the force, the extent of resourcing for CSE and the broader policing 
philosophy all impact on the models observed. It was evident that poor communication 
within forces and fewer resources allocated to CSE had a negative impact on forces’ 
ability to protect children from CSE.   
3.10 The stage of development of the CSE service influences the shape of the response.  
Those established only recently are demonstrating flux, change and instability while 
the response develops. Those that have been in place for longer appear more stable, 
with better relationships with partners in place. They may also have a better 
understanding of the scale of the challenge locally, which may influence resourcing of 
CSE. This could mean, however, that they are more resistant to change.     
3.11 Forces which are at the early stages of developing their CSE response benefit from a 
police-led CSE specialist team to drive cultural change.    
3.12 Officers need time to engage with and support young people, but they also recognise 
the value of partner agencies and work closely with them 
4 Cross-cutting themes in relation to policing activity in 
responding to CSE 
4.1 The findings in this report demonstrate that forces are making extensive efforts to 
tackle CSE. They are testing out approaches. Our police participants demonstrated 
commitment and good knowledge of CSE and policing responses continue to change 
to respond to emerging challenges. However, there are related, systemic challenges to 
practice that emerged across our interviews.  Five cross-cutting themes explaining 
these efforts and challenges are considered below.  
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Data 
4.2 Data recording problems and the resulting paucity of information was felt keenly by 
police officers who took part in this study.  
4.3 The absence of data and/or the availability of poor data resulted in police officers not 
being able to assess the effectiveness of their practice.  
4.4 Police knowledge about prosecutions was informed largely by impressions or 
examples rather than robust and clear statistics.   
Multi-agency working, communication and information sharing  
4.5 There was evidence of good multi-agency working, communicating and information 
sharing.   
4.6 This manifested in some forces in embedded multi-agency partners working alongside 
the police; excellent relationships and joint working with partners to support young 
people; close relationships with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and important 
contributions by partner agencies to disruption activity.   
4.7 There was, however, also evidence of limited multi-agency working and poor 
relationships, communication and information sharing.   
4.8 Developing accurate and up-to-date problem profiles is hindered by difficulties in 
obtaining data from partners.   
4.9 Problem relationships, lack of information sharing and poor communication between 
partners made it difficult to gather evidence, in particular in relation to third-party 
material.   
4.10 The engagement of children and the capacity to offer them support varied depending 
on the relationship that forces had with local partners.  
4.11 Problems and difficulties with multi-agency working, communication and information 
sharing is certainly not a ‘new’ finding. It is important to highlight that this research 
noted these problems to be a continued barrier to effective practice.  
Resourcing 
4.12 There was evidence in some, but not all, forces that resources for CSE responses 
were increasing, or set to increase. A number of CSE teams, for example, were 
expecting an expansion in financial and staff resources imminently.   
4.13 Despite this, resourcing remained a problem, especially in relation to resource-
intensive activities such as disruption (and monitoring some disruption strategies) and 
gathering third-party material, which can take a significant amount of time and staff 
resources. 
4.14 It is evident that some forces are increasing investment, expanding their capacity to 
identify and respond to CSE, which is critical in the context of a rising trajectory in 
identification of CSE by the police and reporting of wider child sexual abuse (CSA).   
4.15 Supporting young people was also recognised as resource-intensive. One force 
appeared to offset this through significant reliance on third sector agencies. Another 
force appeared to address this through the creation of a specialist victim support team 
that was separate from other policing functions like disruption and investigation.  
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4.16 While resourcing will always be a concern for police forces, good outcomes for 
children and young people can only be driven by child-centered approaches. These 
child centered approaches can be resource intensive.  
Assessment/ evaluation of police activity 
4.17 There is no consensus or common set of indicators that suggest what ‘success’ looks 
like. Prosecutions are only one measure, but these do not always align with what 
success looks like from a victim’s perspective.   
4.18 Police participants could only provide anecdotal evidence of whether their disruption 
activities were effective.   
4.19 Similarly, knowledge of whether prosecutions were rising was limited, usually based 
on one or two examples rather than accurate statistics about success.   
4.20 Better and more consistent flagging practices will help forces to improve how they 
evaluate the effectiveness of their work.  
Sharing good practice  
4.21 Across some areas of policing activity, there was evidence that police were unaware 
or uninformed about approaches to disruption and prosecution. For example, some 
participants were unfamiliar with disruption approaches occurring in other forces.   
4.22 Some forces were actively seeking victimless prosecutions, while participants in 
other forces were having little success or felt that these kinds of prosecutions could not 
be pursued.   
4.23 Concurrent to the research, some police regions have established regional 
prevention forums. Further, the police National CSE Action Plan (2016) includes an 
objective for forces to share good practice. As part of their role, the CSE regional 
police coordinators were tasked with facilitating the sharing of good practice across 
forces and regions. Finally, in 2017, a new regional CSE prevention officer network 
was established to identify and share good practice, supplementing the work of the 
CSE regional coordinators and analysts.  It is hoped these strategies have begun to 
address gaps in knowledge as identified within this research.   
Recommendations  
Taking the findings into consideration, we would recommend that: 
1. The findings and summary points from this work are mapped against the police’s new 
Vulnerability Action Plan to protect vulnerable children, including those affected by CSE. 
This would include the police team, under the National Lead for Child Protection and 
Abuse Investigation, working with research project leads to ensure findings are fully 
mapped against The Vulnerability Action Plan and fed into training initiatives arising from 
them. 
 
2. The National Police Chiefs’ Council Lead for Child Protection and Abuse Investigation 
organises an event or open transparent process for CSE police leads to consider the 
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findings from this report, specifically in relation to models of policing that support: 
 
 information sharing 
 appropriate resourcing and structure 
 communication between staff within forces and between forces and external partners 
 engagement with the CPS and 
 supporting children and young people affected by CSE.  
 
3. The CPS improve their recording of CSE cases (perhaps via a flagging system similar to 
that used by the police) and work towards matching CPS records with police records in 
order to better track CSE prosecutions.  
 
4. Individual police forces draw on findings from this report to ‘map’ their response to CSE 
and to use summary lessons learned to inform their developing practice.  
 
5. The College of Policing meet with the researchers to clarify how findings from this report 
can be incorporated into training, staff development programmes and refreshing 
guidance such as the Authorised Professional Practice for child sexual exploitation. 
 
6. The CSA Centre of Expertise, the National Response Unit and the College of Policing 
work together to support the production of a briefing or guidance paper for police drawing 
on these findings, specifically to address the absence of guidance on disruption of 
potential offenders. It is important that this new guidance recognises that there are 
difficult, entrenched problems and embrace the complexity of the issues involved.  
 
7. A full dissemination strategy is developed by the International Centre and the National 
Police Chiefs’ Council Lead for Child Protection and Abuse Investigation. This 
dissemination strategy needs to include:  
 
 an event with children and young people affected by CSE to comment on and 
address questions of young people’s engagement in police-led activities, 
representation of the young person’s voice, and future dissemination of findings 
of this research. This could be initiated through the International Centre’s Young 
Researchers Advisory Panel in the first instance but could also make links with 
the NPCC Lead for Children and Young People.  
 Presentation of findings at the next relevant national police conference(s), other 
professional agency conferences, and at national and international academic 
conferences.  
 Joint publications between International Centre researchers, police colleagues 
who have participated in this research and the Young Researchers Advisory 
Panel in police and academic journals.  
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Section 1: Introduction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 The research presented in this report was carried out by a team at the International 
Centre: Researching child sexual exploitation, trafficking and violence at the University 
of Bedfordshire. The work was funded by KPMG Foundation and Norfolk Constabulary, 
with support from The National Police Chiefs’ Council Lead for Child Protection and 
Abuse Investigation. The work was funded from November 2015 to October 2017, with 
the core fieldwork occurring between June and October 2016.  
1.2 The original overarching aim of the project was “to improve multi-agency work with police 
to prevent child sexual exploitation”. The following six objectives sat underneath this 
aim: 
1. Create evidence-based models of good practice promoting detection, disruption 
and prosecution of those who might, or who have, sexually exploited children.  
2. Create flow diagrams that examine the links between different models of policing 
and local problem profiling, local disruption techniques and rates of arrest and 
prosecution of alleged offenders. 
3. Produce an evidence-based ‘prosecution outcome gaps analysis’ identifying lack 
Key Messages 
 CSA was named as a national threat in England and Wales in March 2015. 
 CSE, particularly online CSE, is now mentioned in the strategic policing 
requirement.  
 Policing activity to respond to CSE has accelerated in recent years. 
 Inspections have found evidence of good practice and improvements to policing of 
CSE, but have also documented on-going challenges facing the police. 
 Inspections show that police forces are not using their disruption powers to full 
effect and research shows that information sharing between police and local 
authorities can be a major barrier to safeguarding children from CSE. 
 Information on the number of CSE convictions is not readily available: police do 
not receive intelligence about all CSE-related crimes; many cases are never 
reported and there are inconsistent approaches to record keeping between and 
within forces. That said, published offence data for 2015/16 shows an increase in 
reporting of all sexual offence categories compared to 2014/15.  
 Published research about ‘what works’ in policing to obtain prosecutions is absent. 
 This is the first study of its kind to document the ways in which some police forces 
in England have structured their CSE responses.  
 This is also the first study of its kind to assess the features of CSE policing 
responses in relation to the outcomes for victims. 
 Despite this, understanding of the relationship between policing responses and 
prosecution outcomes remains elusive in light of problematic data recording within 
police and CPS systems.    
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of evidence in knowledge around effective offender identification, disruption and 
prosecution techniques in the field of CSE, with recommendations to the police 
service about how these gaps in knowledge may be filled.  
4. Engage, where possible and appropriate, with young people who have worked 
with International Centre research and evaluation projects to gain a young 
person’s perspective on recommended models of police practice in multi-agency 
initiatives to prevent, disrupt and prosecute abusers.  
5. Undertake time limited, outcome driven focus groups with police to consult on 
findings from objectives 1 to 3 above. 
6. Produce summary briefing papers disseminating findings across the 43 police 
forces, across all Local Safeguarding Children Boards in England and Wales and 
to children’s charities that provide services to sexually exploited children.  
 
1.3 Findings from objective 1, 2, 3 and 5 are addressed within the report. Engagement with 
children and young people (objective 4) will take place through consultation with 
representatives from young people’s groups in the dissemination process addressing 
findings and considering next step’. Objective 6 will be undertaken following 
dissemination of this report and following consultation with lead police about the 
mapping of findings from this report against key Police Action Plans.  
Most of the work relating to 1, 2 and 3 above was planned to arise from desk-based 
reviews of existing International Centre data (generated through previous research 
project findings; see https://www.beds.ac.uk/intcent/publications ); and from interviews 
carried out with police during the period August 2015 to March 2016 as part of the 
International Centre’s Alexi Project. The initial plan was to seek consent from police 
participants in the Alexi Project to undertake a secondary analysis of their existing 
interview materials. However, it became apparent that this approach would be 
insufficient to inform our research because of the fast-paced nature of changes to CSE 
teams in the intervening period before our research commenced. In light of this, we 
undertook additional primary research in the form of interviews across eight study sites, 
which have provided us with rich data on the ways in which CSE teams are structured to 
respond to the issue.  
 
1.4 Given the findings of this early scoping work and, in particular, the challenges of police 
data (see Section 3) which were unlikely to allow us to make robust links between 
models of policing and recorded outcome data, we focused on identifying specific 
strengths and challenges of particular policing approaches to supporting victims of CSE.   
Research context  
1.5 The scale of CSE is currently unknown. The latest prevalence study on child abuse and 
neglect in the UK did not specifically measure CSE. Therefore, it is not possible to know 
how much of the child sexual abuse retrospectively reported in surveys of the general 
population (24.1% of 18 to 24 year olds; 16.5% of 11 to 17 year olds; and 1.2% of under 
11 year olds as reported by a parent/guardian) reflects contexts of sexual exploitation 
(Radford et al., 2011).  
1.6 What we do know is that reporting of CSA and CSE to the police has significantly 
increased since 2012/2013 (Kelly and Karsna, 2017; Bentley et al., 2017). The observed 
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increase may be due to better police recording standards, but it is also likely to be in 
response to a series of high profile CSA/E cases that have emerged since 2011 (Gray & 
Watt, 2013; HMIC, 2013). The increase in reporting of CSE has important implications 
for the police service,  given that sexual offence cases are some of the most complex 
and lengthy to investigate (McKee, 2014). 
1.7 In response to these cases and subsequent increased reporting, CSA, including CSE, a 
form of CSA (DfE, 2017), was named in 2015 as a national threat1 in the Home Office’s 
Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) (Home Office, 2015). Threats are defined within 
the SPR as: 
Threats to national security, public safety, public order, and public confidence that 
are of such gravity as to be of national importance or can be countered effectively or 
efficiently only by national policing capabilities. PCCs and chief constables are 
expected to plan and prepare, together or in support of national arrangements, to 
address these threats. (Home Office, 2015; p. 7) 
1.8 CSA is identified in the SPR as a “threat of national importance… [of which] its potential 
magnitude and impact necessitate a cohesive, consistent, national effort to ensure 
police and partners can safeguard children from harm” (Home Office, 2015; p. 7). The 
CSA threat as defined in the SPR includes all offences that can be defined as CSA, 
including CSE. Both on- and off-line CSE offences that are linked to serious and 
organised crime are, in addition, captured under the existing serious and organised 
crime threat in the SPR.  
1.9 The UK government issued a number of commitments to tackle CSE in the report 
Tackling child sexual exploitation (HM Government, 2015). One of these was to identify 
CSA as a national threat. This meant that it was prioritised by every police force in 
England and Wales. The then Home Secretary (Theresa May MP) wrote to all Chief 
Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners urging them to respond to the lessons 
emerging from inquiries into CSE and the rolling Child Protection Inspections being 
carried out by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC)2.  
1.10 Even prior to these developments, in 2012, the then Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) Lead for Child Protection and Abuse Investigation (CPAI)3 initiated the 
development of a CSE Action Plan for the police. This was in response to both the 
Government’s Tackling CSE Action Plan (DfE, 2009) and the thematic assessment of 
                                            
 
1
 Threats are assessed and selected from the National Security Strategy and other assessments of 
threat and risk. Issues become threats when they are deemed to affect multiple police force areas, or 
may require resources to be brought together from multiple police force areas in order to be 
countered efficiently and effectively. (Home Office, 2015) 
2
 These inspections can be found on the HMIC website here: 
https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/child-abuse-and-child-protection-
issues/national-child-protection-inspection/ 
3
 The National Police Chiefs’ Council replaced the ACPO on April 1, 2015 as the national coordinating 
body of operational policing (See NPCC website for more detail 
http://www.npcc.police.uk/About/History.aspx)   
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CSE by the ACPO and Child Exploitation and Online Protection Command published in 
Out of Mind, Out of Sight (CEOP, 2011). Subsequent developments also reflected 
learning arising from the Office of the Children’s Commissioner’s inquiry into CSE in 
gangs and groups (Berelowitz et al., 2012; 2013). The Action Plan was updated in 20144 
and, according to the Government’s Tackling child sexual exploitation report (HM 
Government, 2015), all police forces committed to its implementation5. In 2014, the 
NPCC) Lead for CPAI strengthened his commitment to supporting the implementation of 
the Action Plan across forces in England and Wales. This was done through the 
establishment of a network of 10 CSE regional coordinators and 10 CSE regional 
analysts (funded through the Police Transformation Fund) and later, in 2017, a network 
of 10 prevention officers commissioned through the Children’s Society. The regional 
coordinators have been tasked with supporting forces to implement the Action Plan and 
the regional analysts have been working to draw together data on CSE from individual 
police forces to build regional intelligence pictures (problem profiles). This has informed 
a new national picture of CSE across England and Wales police forces and, as a result, 
for the first time, there is now a national picture of CSE based on the best available 
police-held data6.  This shows that, for the period of November 2014 to October 2015, 
there were 7,373 CSE crimes recorded across police forces in England and Wales 
(NPCC, 2017)7. The data has numerous limitations, which will be described in detail in 
Section 3 and in Appendix A. It is important to note that the funding for the network of 
coordinators and funders will come to an end on the 31st of March, 2018.  
1.11 This is a significant achievement in improving understanding of the scale of CSE 
identified by the police. What is unclear, however, is how far this picture, and indeed any 
of the accelerated policing activity in response to CSE across forces, has impacted on 
the detection, disruption and prosecution of CSE, and whether or not there are particular 
models of policing which are better than others at improving outcomes for young people. 
We believe that this studyis the first of its kind to document examples of current 
operating models of police responses to CSE and the first to attempt to assess whether 
there are particular models or features of policing that improve outcomes for young 
people. 
  
                                            
 
4
 The CSE Action Plan 2014-2016 can be found on the College of Policing website: 
https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/major-investigation-and-public-protection/child-sexual-
exploitation/cse-action-plan/ 
5
 The CSE Action Plan 2014-2016 remains active but has not been further updated because of a 
recent move by the NPCC Lead for CPAI (who now also has responsibility as the NPCC Lead for 
Violence and Public Protection), in conjunction with all NPCC leads, to merge all individual 
vulnerability portfolio action plans (such as Domestic Abuse, Missing, CSE and others), into one 
overarching ‘Vulnerability Action Plan’. This is currently undergoing internal review within the police.  
6
 See overview of these figures on the NPCC website: 
http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/CSEProblemProfile.pdf  
7
 This national data can be accessed on the National Police Chiefs’ Council website at 
http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/CSEProblemProfile.pdf 
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Research methodology 
1.12 The original research proposal anticipated that the primary methodology would involve 
secondary analysis of data collected from police interviews in eight forces undertaken by 
the research team on another project running simultaneously within the International 
Centre, the Alexi Project. The Alexi Project is a three-year evaluation of a service 
provision model for victims of CSE8. However, on contacting the police participants who 
took part in the Alexi Project to gain their consent to use their interview material, it 
became clear that policing responses in their areas had evolved since the Alexi Project 
interviews took place. Some police participants shared anxieties about consenting to the 
use of material that they believed was out of date. Anecdotal evidence from regional 
CSE police coordinators and analysts (see 1.10 above) supported this, and inspection 
reports consistently highlight the need for on-going improvements and changes in this 
area of policing (HMIC, 2016a). This meant that the original plan to use secondary data 
from the Alexi Project would not be sufficient to understand the dynamic changes 
occurring within police forces at the present time. As a result, empirical research was 
undertaken with a sample of eight police forces to gather more up-to-date and accurate 
data.  
 
1.13 This research engaged a multi-method approach that combined both qualitative and 
quantitative research techniques. This was broken into three stages as shown in Table 
1.  
 
  
  
                                            
 
8
 See the Alexi Project website for further information: https://www.alexiproject.org.uk/ 
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Table 1: Overview of the research stages  
 
Stage Overview of method 
Literature review of academic and 
professional data pertaining to the 
identification, disruption and prosecution of 
CSE offenders 
This drew on a recent review of all CSE 
policy and literature undertaken by 
members of the International Centre as 
well as additional targeted searches.  
Primary research with police and a small 
number of voluntary sector stakeholders in 
eight forces 
Telephone interviews were carried out with 
police representatives in the eight study 
forces. A small number were also carried 
out with voluntary sector stakeholders 
connected with those forces, to obtain 
external perspectives. Sampling 
approaches and characteristics of the 
forces and participants are described in 
more detail below.   
Focus groups with police In October 2016, a focus group was held 
with police representatives from our study 
forces. We invited representatives that had 
been previously interviewed to join a focus 
group to sharpen our understanding of the 
differences and similarities among forces’ 
response to CSE. Of those invited to take 
part, six police officers from five of the 
eight study forces agreed to join the focus 
group.  
 
Sampling 
1.14 The research draws upon qualitative and quantitative data on CSE teams within eight 
police forces across England. A convenience sampling strategy was used to select the 
eight forces. These were drawn from a larger sample of 16 locales that formed the Alexi 
Project sample. The Alexi Project team had completed fieldwork in these eight forces at 
the time of data collection for the present study. A decision was taken not to conduct 
fieldwork in the remaining eight force areas, where Alexi Project data collection was 
underway, for fear of research fatigue. While not a random sample, the eight study 
forces that are the subject of this research are variable on a number of characteristics. 
These include: force size, authority type, population demographics, number of police 
divisions and collaborative arrangements with nearby forces, and there is variety in 
terms of level of socio-economic disadvantage and ethnic makeup of communities 
where they work.  
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Interviews with police  
1.15 The research involved interviewing police staff from CSE teams across the eight 
selected study forces. In total, 30 police professionals participated in group and 
individual interviews; they represented a range of ranks including Police and Crime 
Commissioner, Detective Chief Inspector, Detective Inspector, Detective Sergeant and 
Police Constable, as well as civilian roles such as researchers and analysts.  
1.16 Potential interviewees were identified via police contacts made during the Alexi Project. 
Using these initial contacts, potential interviewees were contacted by email and 
subsequent participants were identified using a snowballing method. Semi-structured 
interviews were carried out and varied between participants as discussions developed 
around different themes. Interviews lasted between 45-60 minutes producing a broad 
range of qualitative data.  
Interviews with stakeholders 
1.17 In addition to interviews with police, interviews were conducted with six stakeholders 
connected with five of the eight study forces. Our colleagues in the Alexi Project made 
first contact with them to ask their permission for us to invite them to take part in a 
further interview for the current study. These six agreed to a further interview. 
1.18 These stakeholders were practitioners working with CSE-affected children and young 
people, and who came into contact with police through their work. They represented a 
range of specialist voluntary organisations. While six remains a small number of 
interviews, these interviews offered insights into how the police operate in practice, and 
provided an opportunity to check findings from the police interviews.  
Police data 
1.19 After obtaining permission from each of the eight study forces, the NPCC Lead for 
CPAI granted the research team access to individual force data on contact sexual 
offences considered to fit the definition of CSE and/or which had a CSE flag, where 
available (see 1.43 and 3.13 for a description of ‘CSE flagging’ and Appendix A for 
further detail on the nature of this data). This data had been collected by the regional 
CSE analysts (see paragraph 1.10 above) to inform the development of regional CSE 
problem profiles and covers the period from November 2014 to March 2015. We were 
also granted access to the regional problem profiles, also collated by the regional CSE 
analysts, to provide a regional context for individual forces that formed the sample for 
this study. A data sharing agreement between the NPCC Lead for CPAI and the 
International Centre team at the University of Bedfordshire was established, setting out 
the terms and conditions for the use and storage of the data and problem profiles by the 
research team. The data and problem profiles were securely shared with the research 
team, and included the following information:  
 Home Office main and sub-crime codes for contact sexual offences considered to fit 
the definition of CSE and/or which had a CSE flag where available  
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 time and date of incident/offence (requested to contextualise the data in relation to 
the evolution and development of CSE teams during this period) 
 status of investigation codes 
 status of crime report codes 
 CSE flagging (indicator of whether a CSE crime was flagged against a detected 
crime) 
 dates of crime reporting and recording. 
 
1.20 In the original research proposal, we anticipated that data on disruption and 
prosecutions could be obtained in order to match our data on CSE teams or structures 
and modes of delivery. This was to explore the influence of these different teams or 
structures on disruption and prosecution outcomes. However, disruption and prosecution 
data at force level is not available (this is further explored in Section 3 of the report). 
Instead, detection data only (rather than prosecution outcomes) was examined to 
understand the scale of detection among the study forces. The use of this data in this 
report is limited in recognition of the considerable problems CSE regional analysts 
encountered in obtaining it (See Appendix A). Caution must be exercised in the 
interpretation of the police data presented in this report.   
Document analysis 
1.21 Interviewees sometimes provided descriptive documents related to their CSE teams 
and policing protocols and strategies. Where these were made available, they were 
analysed to provide further context and cross-check information from interviews. In 
addition, recent HMIC Child Protection Inspection and Police Effectiveness, Efficiency 
and Legitimacy (PEEL) reports were obtained. These were analysed for contextual 
information for individual forces, as were unpublished regional problem profiles made 
available to us via the office of the NPCC Lead for CPAI.  
Data Analysis 
1.22 Qualitative interview data and documents were managed and analysed in NVivo 11, a 
qualitative data analysis software. Thematic analysis was undertaken to draw out broad 
common and divergent themes in addition to documenting personal experiences and 
reflections on the challenges and achievements offered by individual participants. This 
information, and the additional documents and inspection reports, helped the team to 
‘build’ visual representations of force teams and CSE structures, which could then be 
shared with the participants and our project advisory group to check for accuracy.  
 
1.23 The police data was analysed within SPSS (statistical analysis software) by force. The 
data was converted to CSE crimes per 100,000 population (as per standard crime 
reporting) to allow comparison across forces.  
Ethics and governance 
1.24 Ethical approval for this research was granted in May 2016 by the Institute for Applied 
Social Research Ethics and the University of Bedfordshire Ethics Committees.  
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1.25 Given the nature and sensitivity of police data, a primary concern for the research team 
was ensuring confidentiality of the data from the police forces that were the subject of 
this research. The following actions framed our approach:  
 The research team will not disclose, divulge or communicate the data with any third 
party without the explicit permission of the NPCC Lead for CPAI (as established in 
the data sharing agreement), unless this data reveals evidence of practice that 
places children and young people at risk of significant harm. In this case, the 
concerns would be shared with the Police and University project leads (Chief 
Constable Simon Bailey and Professor Jenny Pearce) and appropriate channels 
pursued.  
 The results and any public-facing publications and presentations produced using this 
data will not contain any personal data (including police force identifiers), as 
established in the data sharing agreement. 
 Individual forces that are the subject of this research have been anonymised in this 
report and will remain anonymised in any future presentations, workshops and 
academic publications.  
 Descriptive data and information about the forces (such as force size, regional 
location, population, etc.) are reported thematically instead of individually to reduce 
the possibility that forces will be identified.  
 Team structures or models for the forces that are the subject of this research are 
presented generically, omitting reference to specific detail that would mean a force 
could be identified.   
 
1.26 In respect of interviews with police and voluntary sector representatives, the interview 
material (recordings and transcripts) have also been treated with the strictest of 
confidence and identifying details (including force and agency) have been removed for 
anonymity. Where quotes are used within this report, a coding identification system has 
been used rather than names, force or role of participant. The coding scheme used to 
identify quotes include anonymised force IDs (the eight forces were named A-H) and 
numbers to refer to order and date of interview (for example F2-3 refers to Force F, 
second interview and date of the 3rd). The same conditions and process for the need to 
breach confidentiality were outlined as in 1.25 above.  
 
1.27 All high-sensitivity data relating to this project (any document that would identify forces 
or participants) and the police data are held on the University of Bedfordshire’s secure 
internal drives within password-protected electronic folders that only the main authors 
have access to. In addition, all documents and databases used to analyse the data are 
password protected.  
 
1.28 Project staff were supervised through regular engagement with Professor Jenny 
Pearce, who herself was accountable to Dr Helen Beckett, the Director of the 
International Centre. A project advisory group was established at the beginning of the 
research to provide expert advice and guidance. The group was comprised of experts 
from policing and academia.  
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Literature review 
1.29 CSE has become an issue of national concern, partly due to the news coverage in 
recent years of high-profile CSE trials. Subsequent national policy developments have 
impacted and influenced police responses to CSE (HM Government, 2015). Resources 
dedicated to tackling CSE have increased across the 43 police forces in England and 
Wales and many forces are currently implementing changes in working structures and 
procedures around identifying, disrupting and investigating CSE (HMIC, 2015c). 
However, evidence about what police interventions ‘work’ is entirely absent from the 
literature. No published research or evaluation is available that characterises the links 
between good practice and better outcomes for children, such as improved prosecution 
and conviction rates (Allnock, 2015).  
1.30 This section of the report draws on the limited available evidence on what we know 
about police working structures and interventions to detect, disrupt and prosecute CSE.  
CSE defined 
1.31 The Children Act 1989 and the Children Act 2004 are the central pieces of legislation 
guiding child protection. According to the latter piece of legislation, Local Safeguarding 
Children Boards have a duty to bring agencies together to promote the welfare of 
children. The statutory guidance Working together to safeguard children details the 
safeguarding responsibilities of various agencies (DfE, 2015). Supplementary guidance 
supports local agencies in their application of the Working Together guidance in the 
specialist area of CSE (Beckett et al., 2017; DfE, 2017).  
1.32 CSE is currently defined in the new Department for Education supplementary guidance 
in the following way:  
Child sexual exploitation is a form of child sexual abuse. It occurs where an 
individual or group takes advantage of an imbalance of power to coerce, 
manipulate or deceive a child or young person under the age of 18 into sexual 
activity (a) in exchange for something the victim needs or wants, and/or (b) the 
financial advantage or increased status of the perpetrator or facilitator. The 
victim may have been sexually exploited even if the sexual activity appears 
consensual. Child sexual exploitation does not always involve physical contact; 
it can also occur through the use of technology. (DfE, 2017; p.5) 
CSE and policing responses 
1.33 Policing responses to CSE detection, disruption and prosecution have changed rapidly 
in recent years. The events in Rotherham and other areas with high-profile CSE trials 
have hugely influenced policing agendas (Harris et al., 2015). There is some evidence to 
suggest that changes in intelligence gathering, information sharing, joint working and 
disruption activities within areas affected by high-profile CSE trials have led to increased 
prosecutions (Ofsted, 2014).  
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1.34 Police are continually learning from other forces that have driven large-scale 
investigations and are shifting from reactive responses to a focus on active targeting and 
early disruption of offenders (Harris et al., 2015). While the police are receiving more 
CSE-related referrals, successful prosecutions are still rare, with high rates of attrition 
recorded throughout the different stages of the criminal justice system (Allnock, 2015; 
Ofsted, 2014). This is not surprising given the potentially traumatic nature of victim 
engagement in the system (Beckett and Warrington, 2015; Beckett et al., 2016) and the 
evidential difficulties in sexual offences cases. 
1.35 The remainder of this section reviews the research evidence on good practice in, and 
challenges to, police responses to CSE. The research evidence is sparse, however.  
Much of what we know emerges from practice evidence or inspection reports.   
Multi-agency working and information sharing 
1.36 Recent research with police officers suggests a desire for better engagement with other 
agencies around intelligence gathering and information sharing (Dodsworth and 
Larsson, 2014). However, research, such as that carried out by the Children’s 
Commissioner for England, identified lack of information sharing between police and 
local authorities as a major barrier to safeguarding children from sexual exploitation 
(Berelowitz et al., 2013). The most recent triennial review of serious case reviews found 
that, among 66 serious case reviews analysed, only one did not mention information 
sharing as problematic, highlighting the continuing contribution of poor information 
sharing to cases which become the subject of such reviews (Sidebotham et al., 2016). 
The authors of the review cite on-going deep cultural barriers which are inhibiting 
information sharing, despite the fact that Data Protection Act 1998 and human rights 
laws are not justified barriers to data sharing. The CSE regional networks of 
coordinators and analysts have been tasked to work with forces to improve gateways 
and intelligence collection and it is hoped that this activity has gone some way towards 
improving information sharing amongst partners.   
1.37 In recent years, local authorities have established, or are working to establish, multi-
agency teams to better facilitate information sharing and improve safeguarding 
outcomes for vulnerable children. While various models of multi-agency working exist, 
local authorities are increasingly opting to establish co-located hubs of agencies, often 
referred to as Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASHs) (Home Office, 2014; Centre of 
Excellence for Information Sharing, undated). Other local authorities manage information 
sharing through ‘single point of entry’ teams that gather information from victims or 
people who want to report a concern. Such teams are not multi-agency, but provide a 
central mechanism for processing and disseminating information (Home Office, 2014). 
Local authorities with established MASHs report improved outcomes for children and 
families, and claim that multi-agency working leads to more accurate assessments of 
risk and need; more thorough and driven management of cases; better understanding 
between professionals; and greater efficiencies in processes and resources (Home 
Office, 2014; Crockett et al., 2013). Although there appears to be consensus around the 
benefits of MASHs and, more broadly, multi-agency working, no research has been 
identified that links this way of working to improved outcomes for children (Allnock, 2015; 
Crockett et al., 2013).  
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1.38 The recent Joint Targeted Area Inspections (JTAI)9 have noted some positive multi-
agency working where information sharing is robust and working is joined-up (see for 
example, HMIP et al, 2016 for Oxfordshire). However, on-going problems remain in 
some areas, including: 
 Failure of police and social work to include other agencies in strategy meetings; 
 Strategy meetings only being called in complex cases;  
 Poor administration of multi-agency sexual exploitation meetings and other multi-
agency meetings, which delay interventions; and 
 A lack of joint agency decision making ‘at the front door’.  
 
1.39 Sidebotham et al.’s (2016) triennial review of serious case reviews found that, despite 
different models of multi-agency working developing across localities, inter-professional 
dynamics, systems and processes could inhibit good joint working. For example, the 
authors of this review found that there were often subtle hierarchies present, whereby 
practitioners defer safeguarding responsibilities to social workers or do not challenge 
senior professionals. 
Identification of CSE 
1.40 Tackling CSE, and protecting, safeguarding and supporting children and young people 
who are at risk of, or who are experiencing, CSE, requires first an awareness of CSE. 
Research shows that knowledge and understanding of CSE by police has historically 
been poor (Berelowitz et al., 2013). Training provided to police officers on CSE has 
increased via College of Policing programmes, and forces have brought in bespoke 
training on CSE in an effort to improve police awareness of the issue. HMIC inspections 
on child protection carried out in the last few years10 have noted improvements in 
awareness among police staff, but also highlight continued variability in awareness and 
understanding of CSE across forces and particular groups of police staff, which 
suggests more work is required to raise awareness of the issue (see HMIC Child 
Protection Inspection reports, 2015-2016).  
 1.41 Effective responses to CSE must not solely focus on young people at risk, but must 
also include proactive identification and pursuit of perpetrators (Beckett et al., 2014). 
Problem profiling – the practice of using research and a range of information sources to 
better understand emerging crime trends, priority locations or other identified high-risk 
issues – has become an important tool for identifying young people at risk of CSE and 
people at risk of offending (Harris et al., 2015; Christie, 2014; Allnock, 2015). A pan-
London study of CSE responses found that boroughs which had developed problem 
                                            
 
9
 These inspections are carried out jointly by Ofsted, Care Quality Commission, Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation in local authorities, police, 
health, probation and youth offending services which are working together to identify, support and 
protect vulnerable children and young people.  
10
 See HMIC website to access HMIC Child Protection Inspection reports published in the last three 
years: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/child-abuse-and-child-protection-
issues/national-child-protection-inspection/  
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profiles reported significant benefits, including better commissioning of support services 
and targeted early interventions (Beckett et al., 2014).  
1.42 Strong problem profiles incorporate intelligence from numerous sources, including 
police intelligence and information from partner services and organisations (Harris et al., 
2015; Allnock, 2015). Dedicated police analysts can help process the large amounts of 
data required for an effective problem profile (Christie, 2014; Home Office, 2014; Jago et 
al., 2011). Information sharing arrangements can also support effective problem 
profiling, along with ensuring police have established a route through which people can 
feed soft intelligence (Harris et al., 2015). The JTAI inspection letters note positive 
outcomes as a result of profiling, such as the targeted training of hotel staff, taxi and bus 
drivers, operators of CCTV and other professionals to recognise CSE (see HMIP et al, 
2016 for Croydon). Sophisticated profiling has been noted to have improved senior 
leaders’ ability to assess the nature and extent of CSE risk across the force area and 
ensure that multi-agency resources are commissioned and targeted appropriately (see 
HMIP et al, 2016  for Liverpool). However, the JTAI letters also note that profiling 
remains underdeveloped in some areas (See HMIP et al, 2016  for Tyneside).  
1.43 Establishing good local problem profiles relies on accurate data held on police systems. 
The Home Office, to date, does not have a crime code for CSE. To address this and 
improve better detection of CSE, police forces have been increasing their use of 
‘flagging systems’ that allow a CSE-related crime to be identified as such. Barnardo’s 
Scotland produced a resource pack for practitioners and specifically name ‘CSE 
flagging’ as one of seven core features of effective local policing of CSE (Barnardo’s 
Scotland, 2014). Further, in recognition of the differences between the legislative and 
policy definitions of CSE, the government has made it mandatory from April 2016 for 
police forces to flag all police recorded offences that meet the policy definition (Beckett 
et al., 2017).  
1.44 Data recording and CSE flagging have been identified as problematic in some force 
areas in England and Wales. The most recent HMIC inspection report on missing 
children found continued inconsistent use of flags (HMIC, 2016a). Inspectors reported 
that while over half of forces used flags – and some forces could identify when a child 
was at risk of CSE – these flags are used inconsistently. Some force IT systems were 
found to be incapable of allowing any flagging at all. JTAI inspection letters also indicate 
significant variability in force development of problem profiling; some forces demonstrate 
sophistication in profiling, which has notably improved senior leaders’ knowledge of local 
CSE patterns, however, in other forces, problem profiles remain weak and 
underdeveloped. Problem profiling at the regional level has been carried out for the first 
time under the auspices of the NPCC Lead for Child Protection and Abuse Investigation, 
in an attempt to understand regional patterns of CSE (Regional problem profiles, 
unpublished). These have resulted in a new national picture of CSE.  
Disruption of perpetrators 
1.45 The ideal approach for tackling CSE is a proactive investigation bringing the greatest 
evidential opportunity to bring a prosecution for CSE (Jago & Pearce, 2008). However, 
the complexity of CSE cases means that gathering evidence is not always 
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straightforward and, as Jago & Pearce note, coercive relationships are often difficult to 
dislodge without alternative methods to disrupt the abusive contexts. The focus of police 
on victims, however, has often been at the expense of targeting perpetrators. 
Recommendations from inspections, guidance and research highlight the importance of 
focusing on perpetrators (Beckett et al., 2017; DfE, 2017; Jago & Pearce, 2008; Jago et 
al., 2011) and one way of doing this is through the proactive use of disruption methods 
to prevent perpetrators from abusing young people via CSE. 
1.46 Police forces have a range of measures available for disrupting perpetrator-victim 
contact, from closing down potential locations of abuse to placing controls on suspect 
behaviour in the absence of a criminal prosecution. Some areas appear to be using 
deterrence measures well (see HMIP et al, 2016 for Oxfordshire) whereas other areas 
have under-developed disruption plans, leading to the removal of the victim from harm 
without any accompanying measures to address what caused or created harmful 
environments (see HMIP et al, 2016  for Central Bedfordshire). Disruption measures 
include the use of civil and/or criminal orders such as Child Abduction Warning Notices 
(CAWNs), sexual risk orders and closure notices. Disruption also involves activities such 
as active patrolling in ‘hot spot’ areas, increasing the safety of risky locations (for 
example, improving lighting and CCTV) and investigating other forms of criminality 
associated with CSE (Beckett et al.., 2017; DfE, 2017; Firmin et al., 2016; Jago & 
Pearce, 2008). Partner agencies also have a role to play in disruption, for example, 
housing enforcement and licensing agencies have taken active roles in entering 
properties and providing intelligence to the police (Beckett et al., 2017; DfE, 2017; Jago 
& Pearce, 2008).   
1.47 However many police forces are not using their disruption powers to full effect (HMIC 
2015b). In 2014, Ofsted conducted a thematic inspection of eight local authorities and 
found that only two were making full use of policing powers to disrupt CSE perpetrators 
(Ofsted, 2014). A study mapping CSE responses in London revealed that disruption 
measures were being used in only half of London boroughs (Beckett et al., 2014).  
1.48 Obtaining accurate and reliable police-recorded data on use of disruption techniques, 
and their subsequent impact on CSE crimes, is challenging – if at all possible. Informal 
conversations with police analysts and police officers working with CSE teams indicate 
that this data, if it is held at all, is likely to be in qualitative format. Certainly, data on 
some techniques may be more readily available than others, but this is likely to vary 
from force to force. This is, importantly, an area for future research.  
Investigation 
1.49 HMIC recently found that over a third (38%) of child protection police investigations 
were self-assessed (by forces) as inadequate. HMIC also suggests that, in comparison 
with other policing areas such as preventing crime and reducing offending (where 39 out 
of 43 forces have been rated as good, one as outstanding and only three as needing 
improvement), police investigations of child protection appear to be weaker overall. 
Inspectors recognised that where child protection matters are clear-cut, policing in this 
area is invariably good. However, if a case was not immediately identified as one of child 
protection (for example, a domestic violence case, a missing child or a child involved in 
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offending), responses are weaker and mixed. Some officers understand the risk and 
vulnerabilities around the child, but others do not (HMIC, 2015b). Investigations are 
often superficial and simple activities such as taking photographs at the incident scene, 
analysing mobile phone data, or referring children to medical professionals or forensic 
examiners were often not undertaken (HMIC, 2015b). Young people – and their parents 
or carers – are not consistently consulted about special measures designed to support 
young people through the criminal justice process (HMIC, 2012; Allnock, 2015; Beckett 
& Warrington, 2015). 
1.50 HMIC’s findings on CSE-specific investigations were mixed. Persistent problems 
include insufficient enquiries after missing episodes and the perception that abused girls 
were making 'lifestyle choices' (HMIC, 2015b). Practice was better in areas where a 
high-profile CSE case had taken place and police learnt from past mistakes (HMIC, 
2015b; HMIP, HMIC, CQC & Ofsted, 2016, Oxfordshire). However, even where practice 
improved within a force, learning was not always transferred across the whole force area 
(HMIC, 2015b). Investigations led by specialist teams were generally of higher quality 
than those led by non-specialist teams (HMIC, 2015b).  
1.51 In a report on online CSE, HMIC identified the following as characteristics of a good 
investigation:  
 Promptly securing evidence, while being sensitive to the needs of the child; 
 Addressing the safeguarding needs of the child throughout the investigation; 
 Appropriate and timely work with partner agencies, including early work with CPS; 
 Informing children and families of case progress;  
 Decision making in the best interests of the child (HMIC 2015d). 
 
1.52 Policies that prioritise safeguarding and appropriate responses to vulnerabilities can 
help young people disclose abuse and lead to better evidence collection (Beckett and 
Warrington, 2015). Safeguarding and investigations are complementary practices, and 
need not be at odds with each other (Beckett and Warrington, 2015; Beckett et al., 2017; 
DfE, 2017). In the investigations assessed as ‘good’ by HMIC, police understood the 
investigation as a child protection matter from the beginning (HMIC, 2015b).  
1.53 Sensitive and empathetic approaches to interviewing victims can also improve young 
people’s experiences (Beckett et al., 2016), potentially giving the young person a better 
opportunity to disclose information important for the investigation. However, research 
suggests that police are inconsistently implementing what is known to be good practice 
around Achieving Best Evidence (ABE)11 interviews, specifically in the areas of rapport 
building, reducing anxiety, questioning styles, and allowing young people to have a 
supporter present during the interview (Beckett and Warrington, 2015). JTAIs identified 
in one area that multiple police teams become involved in CSE cases, meaning that 
                                            
 
11
 Achieving Best Evidence is good practice guidance in interviewing witnesses, including victims, to 
enable them to give their best evidence in criminal proceedings See 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/best_evidence_in_criminal_proceedings.pdf  
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children are interviewed by multiple officers, multiple times, which has been noted to 
undermine police engagement with young people and inhibit disclosures (see HMIP, 
HMIC, CQC & Ofsted, 2016, Croydon).  
1.54 Police investigations that focus on gathering evidence beyond victim testimony may 
also positively affect future prosecutions. In the 2010 criminal trials for CSE cases in 
Derby, prosecutors relied on intelligence gathered by the police during covert 
surveillance of suspects (House of Commons, 2013). Leading up to the Oxford CSE trial 
in 2013, police used alternative investigatory methods such as covert surveillance, 
telephone monitoring and informants to identify an organised gang of offenders (House 
of Commons, 2013). From this initial work, police were then able to identify many of the 
gang’s victims by accessing and pooling together health, social care and school records.  
CSE prosecutions 
1.55 Court records and reports show that perpetrators of CSE have been convicted under a 
range of offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Perpetrators have also been 
convicted under the Protection of Children Act 1978 for offences relating to indecent 
images of children, and under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. However, researchers are 
unable to determine the number of CSE convictions across England and Wales due to 
the scarcity of available figures, the challenges of determining whether a child sexual 
abuse conviction involves CSE and the difficulties of connecting Crown Court 
convictions to a particular police force.  
1.56 Information on the number of CSE convictions is not readily available (HMIC, 2015b). 
Police do not receive intelligence about the majority of CSE-related crimes, and most 
cases are never reported (Beckett and Warrington, 2015). Inconsistent approaches to 
record keeping between and within forces compound this problem (Ofsted, 2014).  
1.57 Published offence data for 2015/16 shows an increase in all sexual offence categories 
compared to 2014/15. According to recent police statistics, there were 37,778 recorded 
sexual offences against children aged 16 and under in 2015/2016, a rate of 36.3 sexual 
offences per 10,000 children under 16 and a 23% increase from 2014/2015. Police 
forces in England provided information on the number of sexual offences against 
children under 18 in response to a Freedom of Information request. There were 47,045 
offences, a rate of 40.3 sexual offences per 10,000 children under 18. The most notable 
year on year changes include:  
 A 30% increase in rape of a male under 13 (from 1,268 to 1,648); 
 Sexual activity involving a child under 16 has increased by 32% (from 8,051 to 
10,661); 
 A 49% increase in sexual grooming (from 652 to 971); 
 Abuse of children under 18 years old through sexual exploitation has increased by 
56% (from 347 to 541). (Bentley et al., 2017) 
 
1.58 The CPS reported that CSA offence prosecutions completed in 2015-2016 rose from 
5,387 to 6,217. This is a rise of 830 (15.4%) and the highest volume ever recorded. 
Successful outcomes for CSA prosecutions rose from 3,975 to 4,643, also the highest 
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volume ever recorded (a rise of 16.8%). The conviction rate rose from 73.8% in 2014-
2015 to 74.7% in 2015-2016 (CPS, 2016). These figures do not include a breakdown on 
the number of convictions for specific CSA offences. Even with such a breakdown, 
researchers would not be able to determine the number of CSE convictions as they are 
not clearly recorded as such.  
1.59 Similar problems arise when trying to connect successful CSE convictions to police 
forces. Researchers can check sentencing records from Crown Courts that operate 
within a police force area. However, Crown Courts sometimes hear cases from outside 
the area where they are located; this is due to court capacity or the suitability of judges 
to adjudicate CSE cases. It is therefore possible that a Crown Court conviction did not 
result from the corresponding police force’s investigation or that the records from a 
Crown Court do not capture all the successful investigations by the corresponding police 
force. 
Summary 
1.60 This section has introduced the research and the broader context within which it is set, 
detailed the methodological approach and provided a brief overview of the literature.  
The literature is sparse in relation to research and/or evaluation of ‘what works’ in 
policing responses to CSE. Most of what is known about police responses emerges from 
inspections, which, while informative, have specific objectives in mind which differ from 
the questions that our research seeks to ask. Our searches yielded no studies that have 
aimed to document policing responses to CSE and even inspection reports provide little 
insight into how CSE responses are structured. This study, therefore, is unique in its 
efforts to capture these responses visually and descriptively. The findings also offer rich 
insight into the practice aligned to policing in this area and challenges encountered 
across policing activity. As this introduction highlights, changes to the original aims and 
objectives had to be made in light of our findings about limitations to police data on CSE. 
This has meant that we were unable to make explicit links between different models and 
prosecution outcomes. Until police data recording practices improve, assessments of 
effective and ineffective policing models will remain an elusive ambition.  
 
 
 
 
  
Section 2 Findings: CSE policing response models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Key Messages 
 This is the first time that ‘models’ of how police respond to CSE have been 
developed. 
 Because there is poor data available on disruption and prosecution of CSE 
cases, it is not possible to map models to outcomes. However, it is possible to 
highlight specific features that are felt to be essential to sustaining good 
victim-centred practice. 
 Models of police structures developed to respond to CSE differ among forces, 
and these structures are fluid and evolving.  
 Four general models of CSE response were found among the eight study 
forces. 
 Responsibility for victim support within these models varies among forces. 
This research shows three approaches: separate victim support; integrated 
victim support and dispersed victim support.  
 Size of force, resourcing for CSE and broader policing philosophy all appear 
to impact on the models observed.  
 Forces which are at the early stages of developing their CSE response may 
need CSE specialist teams to drive cultural change.    
 Where there is an ‘omni-competent’ model with a specialist intelligence team, 
and good communication between staff members in the force and between 
the force and external partner agencies, inspection results are likely to be 
more positive 
 The separation of functions raises questions about communication across 
teams in relation to sharing intelligence and supporting young people. We had 
examples of officers within the same force not knowing what disruption is 
going on within the force, or whether and how information is being shared with 
multi-agency partners. This is more apparent where work with victims of CSE 
and investigation is separated.  
 Successful victim support requires coordination between those responsible for 
training of officers on CSE; those delivering victim support; and those working 
on disruption of offenders and investigation of alleged offences. If all this work 
is the responsibility of one small team, information sharing between staff may 
be enhanced but workload pressures may exceed staff capacity.    
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2.1 This section of the report presents four composite models which exemplify key structures 
and processes for responding to CSE observed in the eight police forces involved in this 
study. These models were developed using data from interviews with members of the 
CSE teams or individuals with CSE responsibility in each of the eight forces. It is 
important to emphasise that the structure and operation of CSE teams are, at the 
present time, very fluid and these structures represent those that were in place at the 
time of data collection (July to October 2016).  
2.2 Visual representations of the structures and processes used in each of the eight forces 
were developed. Following this process, the eight models were compared and 
contrasted and commonalities and differences extracted. Particular focus was placed on 
the location of victim support work within each policing response. From this process, four 
composite models were created to illustrate the major approaches evident in the study 
forces. The composite models have been named to highlight the ways in which victim 
support is integrated into the overall police response. These are descriptive terms only, 
created with no a priori judgments made about the effectiveness or appropriateness of 
the model:  
1) Model 1 – Integrated specialist CSE teams: Victim support integrated with 
investigative functions  
2) Model 2 – Victim-focused specialist CSE team: Victim support separate from 
investigative functions 
3) Model 3 – Intelligence-focused specialist CSE team: Dispersed victim support 
4) Model 4 – No specialist CSE team: Dispersed victim support 
 
2.3 Table 2 presents each of the eight forces (second column) matched to the model that 
best characterises them.  
Table 2: Study forces’ models of CSE response 
Model Force characterised by each model 
Model 1 Forces A, D, E, F, H 
Model 2 Force B 
Model 3 Force C 
Model 4 Force G 
 
2.4 The remainder of this section is primarily descriptive, detailing the nature and structure of 
the CSE response with particular focus on where victim support is located in relation to 
CSE teams. We also integrate recent inspection judgments of the study forces to 
provide wider context of their effectiveness. HMIC judges all police forces on their 
overall effectiveness in four areas: crime prevention, crime investigation, protecting 
vulnerable people, and serious and organised crime. All forces are graded as 
‘outstanding’, ‘good’, ‘requires improvement’ or ‘inadequate’ across these four areas, 
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which then inform the overall effectiveness grade. These judgments are only one 
measure to assess the effectiveness of force response, so readers should use caution in 
interpreting these.   
2.5 At the end of this section, we consider some themes that appear to impact on the 
structure of CSE teams and offer some thoughts on the observed models.  
Model 1 Integrated specialist CSE teams: Victim support integrated 
with investigative functions 
2.6 Model 1 (seen in the figure ‘Model 1’ below) depicts a CSE response that can best be 
described as a single, specialised unit that holds force responsibility for CSE 
investigation, disruption and supporting young people.  
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Model 1: Victim-focused specialist CSE team: Victim support separate from 
investigative functions 
 
CRU/ MASH
Screen for 
CSE
CSE Team
Other Investigation 
Teams 
Other forms 
of CSE/ CSA
Referral into 
Police
Tactical 
meetings
Disruption Investigation Victim work
Prosecution
Multi-agency meetings
 
 
 
 
 
2.7 Forces E and F – two of the smallest forces in the sample, serving populations of under 
1 million – are characterised by this model. Both of these forces have recently established 
CSE teams (since 2014). These will be referred to as ‘Single integrated specialist CSE 
teams’.  
 
2.8 Forces A, D and H – three of the larger forces within the sample, serving populations of 
over 1 million – are also characterised by this model, but show some variations from 
Forces E and F. Forces A, D and H, by virtue of their large size, have multiple divisions 
across the force area, which have implications for the CSE teams. These are described 
below.  
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2.9 We identified three variations of model 1: 
1) A single integrated specialist CSE team (Forces E and F): This describes one single, 
specialised unit that holds force responsibility for CSE investigation, disruption and 
supporting young people, found within single division forces.  
2) A division-wide integrated specialist CSE team (Force A): This describes one single, 
specialised unit that holds force responsibility for CSE investigation, disruption and 
supporting young people, found within multiple-division forces.  
3) Divisional specialist CSE teams (Forces D and H): This describes multiple-division 
forces that have established CSE teams in each division. The teams may mirror each 
other in staffing and functions, but may develop uniquely in relation to local context 
(for example. relationships with partners).  
Model one, variation 1: Single integrated specialist CSE teams 
2.10 Forces E and F each have a single integrated specialist CSE team with force-wide 
responsibility. The small sizes of these forces mean that they are not split by multiple 
divisions. The CSE teams in both study forces were (or were soon to be) responsible for 
managing all elements of the CSE response, including investigation, disruption and 
supporting young people, with support from other teams where relevant. One of the two 
forces characterised by Model 1 has been judged as ‘good’ and the other as either 
‘requiring improvement’ or ‘inadequate’ in terms of overall effectiveness. In respect of 
protecting vulnerable people, both forces were judged as either requiring improvement 
or inadequate.12  
 
2.11 At the point of data collection, respondents in Force E described their CSE approach as 
‘intelligence-led’ and ‘victim-focused’. They were not investigating CSE because, at the 
time, they lacked the resources and capacity to do so. The team was staffed by a 
Detective Sergeant (DS), two Detective Constables (DCs), a third DC (being seconded 
imminently), an intelligence officer and a researcher, all based in the same location, in 
which they were also co-located with the Missing Person’s Unit. The respondents 
explained that the team was due to expand in order to enhance their investigative 
capacity, which illustrates the fast-paced changes occurring within forces in relation to 
their CSE responses:  
 
We don’t have an investigative arm, so we are very victim focused and that’s just 
because of the lack of resources, but come the end of September, I’m getting six 
more DCs and the team is growing quite considerably with the aim that we will deal 
with victims but we will also have an opportunity to deal with the perpetrators. (E5-
2)13  
 
                                            
 
12
 Exact judgements are withheld to preserve anonymity of the eight study forces.  
13 These codes are identifiers for the anonymised forces – a capital letter to represent the Force ID 
(see Table 3) and the numbers that follow represent our system for identifying the order of interviews.  
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2.12 The CSE team in Force F, at the point of data collection, was carrying out investigation, 
disruption and the support of young people. It was staffed by two DSs and six DCs, with 
a further two DCs being recruited to expand their capacity in relation to online offences. 
The team did not have an analyst and respondents agreed that they would benefit from 
having one embedded in the team. They did have access to an analyst who works 
across other teams and would assist where possible, but this work needed to fit around 
the analyst’s many other commitments.  
Model 1, variation 2:  Division-wide integrated specialist CSE team  
2.13 While Force A, like Forces E and F, has a single integrated specialist CSE team, it 
differs because this team sits centrally above the two divisions that divide the force area 
(Forces E and F are not split by divisions). Force A has a population of over 1 million 
(though this is not the largest force in the study sample). It has received a HMIC grading 
of ‘good’ in terms of both overall effectiveness and protecting vulnerable people. This 
force was one of the earliest to set up its CSE response (prior to 2008), prompted in 
reaction to a local case. The CSE team sits within the force headquarters and has two 
‘arms’: one which is dedicated to online CSE and the other to offline CSE. This force 
does not have a dedicated missing team, but each division has a missing persons 
coordinator who feeds information into the centralised CSE team. The staff responsible 
for missing children are ‘owned’ organisationally by the CSE team but operationally, they 
sit under divisional command. The perceived benefit of this centralised model is 
described here by one of the respondents:  
 
There are missing person liaison officers and various other roles and so whilst we are 
at the centre and we cover force-wide responses to CSE, that allows us to escalate 
cases so that there’s that link there, just in terms of how the model works for 
identifying cases and those teams sit on the CSE tasking process. (A1-2)  
 
 2.14 The ‘offline’ team includes one DS and eight DCs. These DCs are all accredited at 
Level 2 by the Specialist Child Abuse Investigation Development Programme. The 
Paedophile Online Investigation Teamis comprised of two DSs, nine DCs and one 
intelligence officer. This team recently expanded, and, at the time of interviews, was 
anticipating a further three investigative support assistants.  
Model 1, variation 3: Divisional specialist CSE teams 
2.15 Forces D and H are also characterised by Model 1, however, instead of one team they 
have two or more CSE teams within the force divisions. Both forces have been graded 
by HMIC as ‘good’ or better on both overall effectiveness and protecting vulnerable 
people. These are two of the largest forces in the study sample.  
 
2.16 Force D has two divisions, with two CSE teams: one located in each division. The 
teams in both divisions mirror each other in terms of staff and response, responsible for 
CSE, adult exploitation and modern day slavery. Each divisional CSE team is comprised 
of three further teams with different responsibilities: an investigation team, a victim team 
and an intelligence team.  
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2.17 A Detective chief inspector (DCI) who sits under the force’s Protecting Vulnerable 
People Unit oversees both of the CSE teams.  Each CSE team is headed up by a DI. 
The investigation teams are comprised of six DSs (three per team) and 27 DCs (14 and 
13 respectively). The victim teams are comprised of two DSs (1 DS per team), eight DCs 
(four per team) and representatives from children’s and adult social care and voluntary 
agencies are embedded in these teams. The intelligence teams are comprised of two 
DSs (one per team), two analysts (one per team), two researchers (one per team) and 
four DCs (two per team).  
  
2.18 Force H is comprised of three regional CSE teams sitting within three force divisions. 
While the three largely have the same functions, their staffing composition is more mixed 
than in Force D. A range of partner agency staff is embedded within these teams. One 
of the three regional teams is comprised of a DI overseeing the team, a DS, seven DCs 
and one missing coordinator (this force does not have a dedicated missing team). Within 
the team, there is a second missing coordinator from the Council (who is embedded in 
the team), as are three social workers, two assistant social workers, an education 
worker, a sexual health nurse and NGO staff. The second of the three teams is 
comprised of a DS, seven DCs, a missing coordinator, three social workers, a CSE 
nurse, NGO staff and a Parents Against Child Sexual Exploitation worker. The third 
team is comprised of a DS, seven DCs and a missing coordinator. One of the 
respondents in this force feels that having specialised, divisional-based CSE teams is 
important:  
I think the idea of having a divisional-based team is a really good idea, because it is a 
very specialist area of policing. (H8-1)  
Model 2 Victim-focused specialist CSE team: Victim support 
separate from investigative functions 
2.19 Model 2 below characterises Force B. Unlike Model 1, this Model separates 
investigation, disruption and victim support. This force is one of the largest of the eight, 
and was graded as ‘inadequate’ or ‘requires improvement’ in relation to ‘protecting 
vulnerable people’ and for overall effectiveness.  
The CSE team 
2.20 The CSE team in Force B is a specialised team responsible for all victim support work. 
The team receives intelligence from the centralised MASH/CRU and from community / 
partner agencies submitted on bespoke community partnership forms. Cases are 
identified through multi-agency strategy meetings, following which the CSE team takes 
on the support aspect of the case. Part of this work includes deployment of disruption 
measures to protect a child or young person and support of young people through the 
investigation process. The team is also responsible for raising awareness of CSE within 
the force and delivering in-house CSE training. This team is made up of one DI, one DS, 
two DCs, five PCs and three Police Staff Investigators (PSIs).  
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2.21 The unique aspect of the CSE response in this force is the separation of victim work 
from investigation. Investigators within three regional child abuse units carry out the 
investigations, with limited contact with victims. The CSE team provides the link from the 
victim to the investigation teams.  
Model 2: Victim-focused specialist CSE team: Victim support separate from 
investigative functions 
  
Screen for 
CSE
CSE Team
Intelligence
Referral into 
Police
Victim work
Investigation 
Teams
In contact
Investigation
Investigation/ Disruption
Prosecution
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Model 3 Intelligence-focused specialist CSE team: Dispersed victim 
support 
2.22 Force C is characterised by Model 3.Investigations and victim support occur across 
existing policing structures rather than within a specialised CSE structure. The CSE 
team  is responsible for awareness-raising, chairing multi-agency CSE meetings and 
tasking disruption activity. It is the smallest of the eight study forces, serving a 
population of under one million, graded by HMIC as good or better on ‘protecting 
vulnerable people’ and good or better on ‘overall effectiveness’ (HMIC, 2017). It is also 
one of the forces who more recently (since 2014) developed its response to CSE.  
CSE team 
2.23 The CSE team in Force C was established within a broader policing strategy of ‘omni-
competence’, referring to an approach that requires all officers to have the skills and 
knowledge to deal with all matters (including CSE). This model sits in contrast to a 
model of specialisation and compartmentalisation (Heslop, 2010).14 The CSE team in 
this force was established in response to a multi-agency audit that found an imbalanced 
response to CSE, with these cases spread across a number of different commands.  
2.24 The role of the CSE team in this force is to create the problem profile and understand 
risk, using intelligence that is fed through from the centralised hub. As such it employs a 
researcher specifically for this role. Intelligence held by the CSE team is deployed to the 
investigative teams, who remain in close contact with the CSE team. The CSE team also 
has responsibility for raising awareness and delivering training on CSE across the force. 
In Force C, the CSE team is small, comprised of only a DS, a researcher, two 
administrative assistants and two missing coordinators.  
  
                                            
 
14
 Keynote speech delivered by Chair, Jan Berry, at the 2007 Police Federation Annual Conference. It 
has been argued that this has led to a ‘deskilling’ of the police force. (Cited in Heslop, 2010) 
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Model 3: Intelligence-focused specialist CSE team: Dispersed victim support  
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 39 
 
Model 4 No specialist CSE team: Dispersed victim support 
2.25 The remaining force can be characterised by Model 4. This force has no named 
specialist CSE unit. Instead, the CSE response, including support of victims, is 
dispersed throughout regional Safeguarding Units.  
 
2.26 This force is one of the largest in the study sample, and is graded by HMIC as less than 
‘good’ at overall effectiveness and protecting vulnerable people. Their response to CSE 
is carried out through Safeguarding Units responsible for child protection, domestic 
violence and serious sexual offences. This force is also underpinned by a model of 
‘omni-competence’ (as is Force 3 – Model 3) where investigating officers are expected 
to be able to respond to any kind of safeguarding case. The force has developed a 
special CSE role, held by an officer that is more experienced in CSE and can be 
allocated to officers to assist with investigations and supporting victims: 
 
The CSE solo will be allocated to build a relationship of trust with that particular 
victim to enable them, perhaps at a later stage, they will say ‘actually yes now I’m 
happy to talk to you and provide an ABE’. (G7-1)  
 
2.27 In this force, the broader safeguarding unit is comprised of three divisional teams. 
Given the force approach of omni-competence, where there is an expectation that all 
investigating officers are responding to CSE, the staff composition taking on CSE cases 
is, unsurprisingly, much larger than those forces that have designated CSE teams. 
There is only one analyst designated to work across these divisions, which some 
respondents felt was insufficient: 
 
The MARACs15 have got quite a big development team set up behind them and I put 
to them that they’re asking for a lot of stats and a lot of analysis… You’ve got to 
invest in it and if you’re looking at a comparative, would be the MARACs. I’d try to set 
up our CSE processes a bit similar to MARACs, so there’s a multi-agency risk 
assessment form that you refer into at essential points that we meet together as 
multi-agencies to discuss. (G7-1)   
 
 
 
                                            
 
15 A MARAC is a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference.  These are risk management meetings 
where professionals share information about  high risk cases of domestic violence and abuse.   
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Model 4: No specialist CSE team: Dispersed victim support 
3 X Safeguarding 
investigation units
Daily strategy 
meeting
Investigation/ disruption
Prosecution
MASH
CSE investigator
Victim work
Allocate 
CSE SOLO
In contact
Neighbourhood 
team
Multi-agency meeting
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Summary and discussion 
2.28 This section of the report described four composite ‘models’ of a CSE response in the 
eight study forces. These models help to orient the reader to some of the key features of 
that response, but, as can be seen above, there are subtle variations within models.  
 
2.29 The lack of police data on disruption and prosecutions means, for reasons explained in 
Section 2, that it is not possible to identify ‘good’ or ‘poor’ outcomes that can be linked 
explicitly to a particular model. The discussion below identifies some of the learning from 
this study about why different models might have developed and what influences their 
impact.   
Size of force 
2.30 The three smallest forces with only single divisions reflect the simplest structures 
characterised by single CSE teams (Models 1 and 3).  
 
2.31 The largest forces have more complex structures with larger teams in place. There are, 
however, important differences among these larger forces, with CSE responses 
reflecting: 1) single, centralised teams working across divisions; 2) divisionally-based, 
multiple CSE teams; and 3) an omni-competent model with no specialist CSE team.  
CSE response stage of development  
2.32 Size of force is only one of the influential drivers of CSE response structures. Stage of 
development may also play a role in the way these responses manifested in the 
interviews at the time of data collection. The point in time at which CSE teams or 
responses were established in the eight study forces varies, with two having been set up 
prior to 2010, three established only in 2014, and the remaining three set up between 
2011 and 2013. Where participants told us they were imminently expanding capacity 
and staff, they were part of CSE teams or responses that were set up within the last five 
years. It is likely, that as these forces continue to expand, grow their capabilities and 
learn from other forces, their models will also change shape.  
Resourcing  
2.33 Resourcing was also cited as a key driver of the current set-up by some participants in 
the study. In the Model 2 force, characterised by a split in the victim support and 
investigative functions, respondents across both teams (the CSE specialist victim team 
and the investigation team) reported that resourcing was currently shaping the response. 
The CSE victim team is responsible not just for victim support but also for disruption. 
According to a participant on the victim team, this is because the investigators lack the 
resources (time, money) to engage in disruption. A participant from the investigation 
team also considered that combining specialist victim support with investigative 
functions might result in enhanced investigations, but at the time of interview, these 
functions were separate because of resourcing issues.  
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Supporting young people and working with victims 
2.34 Approaches to working with victims showed some variation (with more detail to emerge 
in Section 4 of this report). Force B (Model 2) and Force D (Model 4) showed some 
separation of victim support and investigative functions, unlike all the other forces in the 
study. The key difference between these two is that the Force B has complete 
separation of victim work and investigation. The investigators do not come into contact 
at all with young people, although participants said that a link is maintained between 
these two functions. In Force D, each of the two divisional CSE teams has a ‘victim 
team’, but these sit within the overarching CSE team alongside the ‘investigation’ and 
‘intelligence’ teams. This suggests that the victim, intelligence and investigation teams 
have a closer, more integrated relationship than in Force B.  
Policing approach 
2.35 Another feature of interest is the broader philosophical approach to policing of ‘omni-
competence’. Forces C and G subscribe to an omni-competent approach, which 
significantly impacts on the role of specialist CSE officers. In Force C, the CSE team is 
small and responsible primarily for intelligence, analysis, problem profiling and 
awareness raising, with no investigative or victim support functions. In Force G (which 
has no CSE team), a new ‘specialist role’ has been developed to work alongside 
investigators in supporting victims who may be reluctant to engage with the police.    
Summary 
2.36 This section of the report described the structure and processes of police force 
responses to CSE in the eight study forces.  The models were developed in aggregate 
to preserve anonymity but retain essential characteristics and features of the response.  
They demonstrate the variations in structure and process across forces and the 
qualitative data from interviews highlighted at least some drivers that have likely shaped 
the models that are manifest in forces. We cannot say how representative these four 
composite models are of all forces in England and Wales. Local contexts of policing are 
likely to produce many other variations. These models can be used by those responsible 
for organisational change to think strategically and carefully about the evolution and 
direction of their own CSE responses.   
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Section 3 Findings: Challenges to the alignment of policing 
models with police data on prosecutions   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Objective 3 of this study as set out in the Introduction to this report was to: “Produce an 
evidence-based ‘prosecution outcome gaps analysis’ identifying lack of evidence in 
knowledge around effective offender identification, disruption and prosecution 
techniques in the field of CSE, with recommendations to the police service about how 
these gaps in knowledge may be filled”. This substantive part of the report, therefore, 
starts with these gaps in knowledge, given their centrality to our ability to articulate CSE 
prosecution outcomes, as well as the impact they have had on this research.  
3.2 The following topics are considered in this section of the report:  
 What are the policy-legislative gaps?  
 What are the gaps in relation to: 
o police recorded crime data on identification (detection) of CSE? 
o police recorded crime data on disruption of CSE? 
o police recorded crime data and CPS data on prosecutions of CSE?  
 
3.3 While this research set out with a focus on prosecution outcomes, we acknowledge that 
prosecution is only one of a number of outcomes of importance for young people. Our 
focus on prosecution is in no way meant to minimise other outcomes which are equally 
as important for young people’s emotional and physical safety. Other research has 
highlighted the often traumatic experiences children and young people report following 
their engagement with the criminal justice system (Beckett & Warrington, 2015; Beckett 
et al., 2016). These studies also highlight the conflicting processes of investigation and 
safeguarding. These should always be in balance, but often tip towards the needs of the 
investigation at the expense of safeguarding the child. Further research is required to fill 
a gap in knowledge about the range of outcomes and which outcomes are most critical 
Key Messages 
 There is a lack of police data on disruption and prosecutions, which means that 
aligning police models with these outcomes is not possible at the present time.  
 Additional challenges to understanding CSE prosecutions include a gap 
between the current policy definition of CSE and the Sexual Offences 
legislation.  
 CSE crimes are recorded according to the Sexual Offences Act (2003) which 
does not adequately distinguish between CSE and other CSA crimes.  
 While forces are now required to flag CSE crimes and report this data annually 
to the Home Office, challenges to officers’ understanding of CSE; complex and 
fractured IT systems; and the policy-legislation gap call into question the 
accuracy of this data.  
 While we have been able to access detection data on CSE crimes, questions 
about the accuracy of this data means that caution is needed in interpreting it.  
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for young people, and this knowledge should be commonly understood, agreed and 
used across all safeguarding agencies so that all victims receive the best service.  
The legislative and policy context  
3.4 The legislative and policy context of CSE presents particular challenges to data 
recording by the police and other agencies, which has direct implications on the 
accessibility and quality of police-held data on CSE.  
 
3.5 The definition of CSE as outlined in the DfE (2017) guidance (see paragraph 1.34) 
officially acknowledges CSE as a form of CSA but identifies exchange for the benefit of 
the victim, the perpetrator or both as the crucial dynamic differentiating it from other 
forms of CSA. Exchange, in policy terms, must involve a benefit to the perpetrator over 
and above that of sexual gratification and benefit may be financial or relate to increased 
status for a perpetrator or facilitator.  
 
3.6 Benefit to the victim is understood to be broad, not limited to financial or other tangible 
exchange, but may also include intangible rewards such as love, protection or status. 
While this broad definition helpfully includes a range of abusive contexts that may 
otherwise remain hidden, the expansive definition has been acknowledged to present 
challenges to professionals, including the police, in recognising sexual offences that can 
be defined as CSE. These challenges include variations in awareness and understanding 
of the significance of exchange (Melrose, 2013).  
 
3.7 Unhelpfully, there are important differences between what is considered CSE within the 
policy definition (which is expansive) and the legislation that governs sexual offences 
(which is narrow). The main set of offences used in criminal prosecutions of CSE is 
contained within the Sexual Offences Act 200316 (SOA) (See extended discussion on 
the SOA in the latest extended CSE guidance published by Beckett et al. (2017, p. 50, 
section C.II). Prior to 2015, this legislation had no offences within it named ‘sexual 
exploitation’ (instead referring to ‘prostitution’ – see below). The SOA was, however, 
amended by the Serious Crime Act 201517 to remove references to ‘child prostitution’ 
and ‘child pornography’ and replace them with ‘sexual exploitation of a child’. The 
changes were made to the following offences:  
 
 Section 48: causing or inciting child prostitution or pornography  
 Section 49: controlling a child prostitute or a child involved in pornography  
 Section 50: arranging or facilitating child prostitution or pornography.  
 
3.8 Changes were made to the phrasing of these offences to clearly reflect that children 
                                            
 
16
 See Sexual Offences Act 2003 at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/42/contents 
17
 See Serious Crime Act 2015 at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/9/contents/enacted/data.htm 
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involved in such activities were victims of abuse. This did not, however, change the 
behaviours to which these offences apply, which remain the recording of an indecent 
image of a person or the offer or provision of sexual services to another person in return 
for payment or a promise of payment. Importantly, the SOA offences do not capture all 
offences that would fall under the new policy definition of CSE in that: 
 
 The exchange is limited to ‘financial advantage’, whereas the policy definition 
includes broader things the victim and offender could receive.  
 The offence relating to the recording of an indecent image of a child does not require 
an exchange; this is outside the policy definition of CSE but would fall under the 
definition of child sexual abuse more generally (Beckett et al., 2017; p. 52).  
 
3.9 These notable differences between current policy and legislation have important 
implications for the recording of police data in relation to CSE.  
 
Police recorded data on CSE: Detection 
 
3.10 Assessment of the scale of identified CSE detected by the police is, at present, not 
possible, precisely for the differences outlined above in the legislative and policy context 
and as highlighted by the NPCC Lead for CPAI. The reliability and consistency of police 
recorded crime more generally have been called into question for some time, with 
concerns about police compliance with the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) 
cited as a key concern, among other explanations (House of Commons, 2014; Maquire 
& McVie, 2017). There is, therefore, already a precedent set that raises serious 
questions about the ways in which police record data, although compliance with the 
NCRS is said to be improving (Kelly & Karsna, 2017). The challenges in recording CSE 
add additional layers of complexity to an already problematic process.  
 
3.11 The policy-legislation gaps set out above provide the police with a considerable 
challenge in recording the detection of CSE. The police record crimes according to 
Home Office counting rules (Home Office, 2011; Home Office, 2017) which reflect 
offences defined in legislation and which are liable or subject to judicial or quasi-judicial 
examination or trial. Where a CSE crime is understood to fit Sections 48, 49 and 50 of 
the SOA, it will be recorded to these offences accordingly (if it is recognised as CSE, 
which raises further questions – see below). All other CSE crimes that fit the expanded 
policy definition of CSE (but do not reflect sections 48, 49 and 50 of the SOA) are 
instead recorded within other sexual offences in the SOA. Regional CSE analysts 
reported that, across individual forces, between 16 and 18 Home Office crime codes and 
between 56 and 91 sub-codes may be used to categorise offences deemed to be CSE-
related, illustrating the scale of the problem of easily estimating CSE (unpublished 
regional problem profiles, 2016). An additional problem is that crimes that fall under 
Sections 48, 49 and 50 may not be CSE-related offences if they relate to the recording 
of an indecent image of a child that does not involve exchange, therefore it can be 
challenging to extricate which offences under these Sections are actually CSE-related.  
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3.12 This current practice is problematic in understanding the scale of detection of CSE 
because crimes falling under Sections 48, 49 and 50 will not all be CSE crimes or CSE 
(where identified as such) will be recorded under generalised sexual offence crimes. The 
CSE element of the crime thus becomes easily lost, making it impossible to accurately 
identify which crimes are CSE and which crimes are other types of CSA.  
Remedying the challenges presented by policy and legislation differences  
3.13 In recognition of the differences between policy and legislation described above, the 
Home Office made it mandatory from April 2016 for police forces to flag18 all police 
recorded offences that meet the policy definition of CSE (Beckett et al., 2017; Kelly & 
Karsna, 2017). This includes those that fall under Sections 48, 49 and 50 as well as 
those falling under other sexual offences that are being perpetrated within the context of 
CSE (Beckett et al., 2017).  The Home Office also require all CSE crimes to be flagged 
as CSA. In other words, all CSE cases should be flagged as CSE as well as CSA. The 
practice of flagging CSE against generalised sexual offences means that, in theory, 
those sexual offences involving circumstances of CSE can be easily identified. In turn, 
this should mean (again, theoretically) an improved ability of the police to effectively and 
quickly identify victims of CSE, report the scale of detected CSE crimes and track 
prosecution outcomes. CSE flagging is now considered to be an important component of 
an effective response to CSE (Beckett et al., 2017).  
 
3.14 Despite this, CSE flagging practices remain inconsistent both within and across forces, 
resulting in unreliable police data on CSE. Successive HMIC Child Protection 
Inspections and regional problem profiles produced by regional CSE analysts have 
found that flagging practices are not consistently adhered to (see, for example: HMIC, 
2015d; HMIC, 2016a; HMIC, 2017a; see HMIC website for full complement of HMIC 
Child Protection Inspection Reports; unpublished regional problem profiles, 2016), as 
the following quote captures:  
 
Markers and flags had recently been introduced for such cases but were not being 
applied routinely by staff. The force could not be confident, therefore, that relevant 
cases were visible on IT systems. (HMIC, 2016) 
 
3.15 It is unclear how far the low compliance with the practice of flagging CSE can be 
explained by wider crime recording practices as noted above. HMIC inspection reports 
identify specific CSE-related problems with flagging, including, but not limited to, poor 
understanding of CSE amongst individual officers and other staff (leading to both under- 
and over-use of flags); limited time and resources of individual police staff to consistently 
flag; and complex IT systems that are difficult to use. More generally, the process of 
applying flags is done manually and it is one of a number of fields which an officer is 
required to complete. The complexity noted above may, therefore, result in non-
compliance and/or application error by the officer. Further complicating this is the recent 
change in definition (made official in March 2017) which may cause initial confusion and 
                                            
 
18
 Flagging is a way of electronically marking that a case fits the policy definition of CSE.  
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requires training and time for this learning to be absorbed.   
 
3.16 The Home Office has an annual data requirement (ADR), requiring a list of all requests 
for data made to all police forces in England and Wales under the Home Secretary’s 
statutory powers. This is used to report crime and policing related statistics. The 2017/18 
includes CSE flagged crimes for the first time. It remains to be seen whether this 
requirement will be a step towards enforcing improved flagging practices in police 
forces. A report assessing compliance with CSE flagging is due to be published later in 
2017 (Kelly & Karsna, 2017).  
Implications for this research  
3.17 In relation to the current research, we have obtained police recorded crime data on 
CSE crimes from all eight forces. This data was obtained through the office of the NPCC 
Lead for CPAI and collated by CSE regional analysts, whose roles have been to obtain 
individual force CSE-related data to inform regional and national profiles of CSE. 
Individual forces granted permission for us to use this data. However, given the 
concerns outlined above, the data in this research is exploratory only, and should be 
interpreted with strong caution. Appendix A outlines the nature and content of this data 
as well as limitations to the data drawn from cautions made by regional CSE analysts in 
a series of unpublished regional problem profiles. Table 3 below presents the number of 
CSE offences, per 100,000 population, in the eight study forces.  
 
Table 3 Number of CSE crimes per 100,000 population in the eight study forces 
 
A) Study 
force 
B) Model 
type  
C) Number of CSE 
offences 
obtained by 
CSE regional 
analysts  
D) Number of CSE 
offences obtained 
by CSE regional 
analysts per 
100,000 population  
A 1 80 8 
B 2 126 7 
C 3 30 5 
D 1 40 3 
E 1 84 13 
F 1 6 .9 
G 4 135 8 
H 1 572 38 
  Total: 1,073  
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3.18 The table above shows that recorded offences range from 0.9 per 100,000 population 
(in Force F) to 38 per 100,000 (in Force H). Force F data was only partial, however, 
because the CSE regional analyst in that location left their role before this work was 
complete. The average number of CSE offences (omitting Force F data) is 11 per 
100,000 population while the median is 8 (Force H data skews the average upward).  
Police recorded data on CSE: Disruption 
3.19 ‘Disruption’ refers to activities or measures designed to prevent risky and abusive 
activity and situations. Whilst it is recognised that disruption activity should not occur at 
the expense of prosecution and other safeguarding measures, it can be seen as an 
essential strand of a comprehensive response to CSE, particularly where criminal 
convictions cannot be secured (Beckett et al., 2017). Disruption measures can be formal 
and legal. For example, a range of licensing laws or civil orders may be used to close 
down potential locations of abuse, restrict victim/perpetrator contact or place other 
controls on suspect behaviour in the absence of a criminal prosecution. Examples of 
formal disruption measures include Child Abduction Warning Notices, Sexual Harm 
Prevention Orders, Sexual Risk Orders or Slavery and Trafficking Risk Orders (see 
Beckett et al., 2017 for a fuller list of available measures).  
 
3.20 There are other non-legal strategies that can be, and are, applied by police, often in 
partnership with partner agencies and professionals. Jago et al.’s (2011) research 
identified, for example, early prevention measures such as making areas that young 
people are known to frequent unsupervised safe, addressing specific risk and known 
‘hot spots’ and giving informal warnings to people whom the police have concerns about.  
 
3.21 In the main, disruption data is poorly and inconsistently recorded and tells us little about 
actual practice (Berelowitz et al., 2013). Data that is recorded is most likely to be the 
formal, legal measures used rather than informal activity, and even then, it is recorded 
inconsistently. In the early scoping phase of this work, we spoke to CSE regional 
analysts who confirmed that disruption data was poorly recorded and therefore 
unreliable and indeed, no disruption data was successfully obtained for regional problem 
profiles. They added that disruption data was most often found in qualitative note format 
and would, therefore, not be easy to access within the scope of this research.  
Implications for this research  
3.22 Unfortunately, we have been unable to obtain any recorded police data on the use of 
disruption measures within the eight study forces. Although we requested, where 
possible, disruption data from the CSE teams in the eight study forces, we were 
informed that either they do not keep this data readily available or it is not in shareable 
format. The interviews with police officers as part of this study, however, provide some 
rich information about the ways in which disruption measures are being used and their 
perceived usefulness.  
  
 49 
 
Police recorded data on CSE: Prosecution 
3.23 We have also been unable to obtain any data on prosecutions of CSE. While 
prosecutions are possible to record on police data systems, this requires the police 
involved in cases to record the outcomes following a trial. Our early scoping 
consultations with regional CSE analysts indicated that this is rarely done and little data 
exists on police systems about prosecutions. The consultations also revealed that data 
held within the CPS would be of limited use in describing CSE prosecutions (apart from 
those identified as falling under sections 48, 49 and 50 of the SOA 2003) because they 
record other forms of CSE under broader SOA offences similarly to the police (as 
described above). A consultation was held by the newly established CSA Centre of 
Expertise in 2017 on sources and quality of CSA/E data. The Centre invited an inclusive 
range of agency representatives, including CPS and the Ministry of Justice which are the 
key agencies that hold prosecution outcomes data. Reporting on the findings of this 
consultation, Kelly & Karsna note that:  
 
Currently in the nationally available data, CSE can only be seen under two very 
restricted offence categories – abuse through exploitation and sexual grooming – 
across all criminal justice systems, and image offences involving a CSE element 
(making, distributing or publishing) are separated in CPS and MoJ data. As such, 
only a fraction of CSE is currently visible in justice system data, although it is hoped 
that this will change when the use of CSE flags is fully implemented. (Kelly & Karsna, 
2017, p. 43) 
3.24 An additional challenge to tracking prosecutions relates to the complete separation of 
justice systems. Victims and perpetrators in police systems can only be identified in CPS 
systems by name (in other words, there is no common identifier in police and CPS 
systems that would allow easy identification of individuals) (Kelly & Karsna, 2017). The 
only way, at present, that it is possible to track prosecutions is to follow named 
individuals from police records through to CPS records, which has significant resource 
and ethical implications for researchers.  
Implications for this research  
3.25 As with disruption data, we were unable to obtain any data on prosecutions of CSE. 
Moreover, qualitative interviews with police in CSE teams revealed that even these 
teams are unaware of the scale of successful CSE prosecutions because of the 
problematic nature of the data. It is recognised across the field that these problems 
faced by practitioners in recording data have an adverse impact on the capacity for 
researchers to adequately portray an accurate picture of what is happening on the 
ground. Information of this kind will be largely unachievable until substantial strides are 
made in data recording practices across the criminal justice system. 
Summary 
3.26 As set out at the start of this section and in the introduction to this report, we had 
originally sought to examine different policing models in light of CSE police data on 
detection, disruption and prosecutions in the eight study forces to identify whether 
certain models could be linked with improved policing responses to CSE. As the above 
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discussion on policy, legislative and data challenges emphasises, however, we have not 
been able to fully achieve this objective. We have, however, been able to use the data 
that is available to suggest ways that it might be used and recognise learning that has 
come from the activity overall.  
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Section 4 Findings: Areas of policing responsibility 
 
4.1 Section two of this report introduced four composite models and described the ‘shape’ of 
the CSE response, with specific reference to where support for young people sits in this 
response. This section considers our police participants’ experiences and perspectives 
in relation to key areas of responsibility in policing in the area of CSE to identify good 
practice and challenges in this work:   
 referrals  
 disruption 
 investigation 
 prosecution 
 supporting young people.  
Referrals  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 All eight forces have some form of centralised system in place for prioritising and 
assigning referrals to the appropriate teams. All forces receive referrals from the 
community (including parents, professionals, businesses) into a main call-handling desk. 
Referrals coming in this way will be triaged and, in all but one force, referred into a Multi-
Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH), Central Referral Unit (CRU) or a similar structure. 
Although bearing different names, these are examples of multi-agency information 
sharing structures, which have been developing since 2011. Their aim is to improve the 
safeguarding response for children and vulnerable adults through better information 
sharing and timely safeguarding responses.19 While a range of partner agencies may be 
a part of these structures, the core group tends to include Police and Children’s Services 
                                            
 
19
 See Home Office report Multi-agency working and information sharing project. London: Home 
Office. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/338875/MASH.pdf 
 
Key Messages 
 All forces in this study have a centralised system for prioritising and assigning 
referrals to appropriate teams.  
 Most forces have Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs or a Central Referral Unit 
through which referrals are screened.   
 Most police participants felt that having a Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub or 
Central Referral Unit streamlines referrals and reduces duplication of work.   
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safeguarding leads (Centre of Excellence for Information Sharing, undated). The 
MASH/CRU will assess and then distribute referrals to the appropriate teams, as 
described in the previous section.  
 
We have a PVP [protecting vulnerable people] system, so any officer that gets 
telephoned, any telephone calls that come into the constabulary from members of the 
public, or from anywhere to be fair, come in via our communications department. 
That gets filtered out to a Response Officer who will go and respond in whatever way 
he sees fit, come back and he’ll write that down onto a PVP form. Which gets shared 
to a MASH, and then because we don’t wait for the MASH to do anything, we read 
each of those PVPs in the morning and pick up any that we think are anything to do 
with CSE from a policing perspective and discuss them as a team in the morning. 
But, we can only do work once it’s ‘mashed’, and that’s a verb now I believe 
[laughing]. (H8-1)  
4.4 There are some variations evident between forces however. In Force C (Model 3), 
referrals will be made into a centralised MASH/CRU, although some are also made to a 
centralised social care team who will undertake a first screening and refer on, where 
appropriate, to the MASH/CRU. Police participants in Force C expressed concern that 
the centralised social care team may not be screening in similar ways to the force 
screening process. Force E (Model 1) does not have a multi-agency structure, therefore 
referrals from partner agencies or the community come through to a centralised 
‘vulnerability’ desk within the Public Protection Unit, operated by civilian staff who 
disseminate referrals out to relevant teams. The vulnerability desk operates during office 
hours and, outside of these times, referrals are made via 999.  
4.5 Referrals are made by community agencies and professionals at these primary access 
points on referral forms, which may be referred to variously as partnership information 
forms, child concern notification forms or other bespoke forms and toolkits. Once 
received, cases are screened and relevant checks are carried out with Children’s 
Services if appropriate. These structures and the accompanying processes in place for 
prioritising and allocating referrals were viewed positively by police respondents, who 
noted that they streamline referrals and reduce duplication of work:  
 Any referral from professional agencies in the community will go through to a central 
referral unit, where they’re looked at and distributed accordingly. We’ve had issues in 
the past where the information is coming through lots of directions and we can find… 
duplicate work and research. By doing it through a central referral unit and filing it 
through a team we can deal with the information more appropriately and put 
interventions in place. (A1-3)  
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Disruption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6 Disruption, in a policing context, refers to the interruption of risky and abusive activity 
and situations (Jago et al., 2011). The police can often find it difficult to gather sufficient 
evidence of CSE, even if they suspect that it is occurring. This can occur for a number of 
complex reasons. Victims do not frequently report the abuse, because they may be 
afraid to or they may not recognise they are a victim. Even when victims do come to the 
attention of the police, they are frequently only able to provide aliases, nicknames or 
physical descriptions of offenders (Berelowitz et al., 2012). These difficulties do not 
absolve the police of responsibility in tackling perpetration. The police are able to use 
disruption techniques or strategies to protect children and young people in the absence 
of clear evidence on CSE.  
 Because the nature of CSE is such, it is quite a hidden harm, it’s not something that 
is overt to the public, I think that we’ve looked at it tactically and thought, okay we are 
accessible as a police service but actually by the very nature of the victims of CSE 
they don’t identify themselves, or often don’t identify themselves as victims, so let’s 
look at it from the intelligence point of view where we can then gather that 
intelligence and look to disrupt the activity, whilst still continuing to try and engage 
with those victims. So that’s working well. (E5-3) 
4.7 We asked police participants to tell us about disruption techniques being used in their 
forces. The question was an ‘open’ format, which means that participants likely told us 
about the techniques most familiar to them or most frequently applied in their force 
Key Messages 
 Disruption methods can be used by the police to prevent CSE and protect 
young people in the absence of evidence or disclosures. This should not be 
done at the expense of prosecution, but can be considered an important 
component of an effective CSE response.  
 Participants described a range of disruption strategies they are using in 
relation to perpetrators and locations.   
 Multi-agency partners are involved in disruption in a number of ways. They 
provide important information that can be analysed for intelligence to direct 
disruption activity. They are also involved in disruption, but most often in 
relation to victims.   
 Important intelligence is also generated from missing coordinators/missing 
teams, neighbourhood policing teams, parents and via covert surveillance.  
 Decision making in disruption strategies is usually bespoke, made on a case-
by-case basis.   
 Disruption must be supported by sufficient resources. Some strategies 
require monitoring and follow-up to be effective and participants identified 
resourcing as the most important challenge to disruption work.  
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areas. While they told us about a range of approaches targeting perpetrators and 
locations, there are many more possible approaches that can be used that were not 
mentioned. This may be because there is no national comprehensive guidance on 
disruption approaches that can, and should, be used and practice is not easily shared 
across forces.     
4.8 Participants in our study forces described a range of techniques or approaches being 
used to disrupt suspects or adults of concern:  
 Participants in all eight forces reported the use of Child Abduction Warning Notices 
(CAWNs) to disrupt suspects. CAWNs are an established police tactic for the 
disruption of grooming and exploitative offending behaviour (CEOP, 2011; Jago et 
al., 2011; Berelowitz et al., 2013). These are used to disrupt an adult’s association 
with a child or young person, served as a warning to an adult that they have no 
permission to associate, contact or communicate with a child, and that if they 
continue to do so, they will be arrested and prosecuted. There is no reliable data or 
research that clarifies the effectiveness of CAWNs (Newiss & Traynor, 2013).  
 
 Participants in four forces told us that they arrest as swiftly as possible in order to 
obtain bail conditions, as the following quote demonstrates:  
 
With a known suspect, we generally get them in at the earliest option which is 
going to disrupt them, but that’s on the back of what we think is a criminal 
offence occurred, so we tend to be quite proactive in that if we get an out of 
force enquiry, if we’ve got reasonable suspicion, we’ll bring them in, because 
therefore we can get their computers, we can get their phones at the earliest 
opportunity and get them on bail conditions. (F6-3) 
 
 Sexual Risk Orders and Sexual Harm Prevention Orders were mentioned 
specifically by participants in four forces. In 2013, Berelowitz et al.’s (2013) research 
found little evidence that forces were using these.  
 
 Restraining and non-molestation orders under Section 42 of the Family Law Act 
1996 and Section 12 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 were 
mentioned by participants in two forces.  
 
 Asylum and Immigration enquiries were mentioned by participants in two forces.  
 
 Participants in two forces mentioned Automatic number plate recognition, which 
allows police to ‘flag’ vehicles believed to be involved in transporting children for 
CSE, collecting victims from children’s homes, acting as locations for sexual abuse 
or cruising streets looking for children to approach.  
 
 Civil Injunctions under the Civil Injunctions Section 1 Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime 
and Policing Act 2014 were mentioned by one participant.  
 
4.9 In addition, police participants told us about disruption practices that target locations of 
concern:   
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 Participants in three forces mentioned that drugs warrants (under the Misuse of 
Drugs Act) have been useful in disrupting activity at particular locations. These can 
be helpful when police find it difficult to obtain evidence of CSE offences.  
  
 Participants in three forces mentioned the use of Closure Notices under the Anti-
Social, Crime and Policing Act of 2014. These can be used when there are 
reasonable grounds to believe premises have been used unlawfully, in relation to 
Class A drug use, or where the premise is associated with the occurrence of 
disorder or serious nuisance to members of the public.  
 
 Participants in two forces reported the use of active patrols in hot spot locations to 
disrupt activity (usually the 'beat' cops or neighbourhood teams). The increased 
visibility of police is thought to deter risky or abusive activity in hot spot locations.  
 
 Participants in two forces mentioned that they work with local authority taxi licensing 
authorities to revoke licenses or implement temporary closure on taxi firms while 
investigations are under way.  
 
 Participants in two forces described disruption activity in relation to the night time 
economy; one in relation to licensing and one force providing training and 
awareness to business owners as well as patrolling city centres at night.  
 
 Participants in two forces noted that they often engage in multi-agency disruption 
with the Fire Department under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. The Fire 
Department may enter a premise first to do a safety check, then gather information 
on who is there. They then feed this information back to the police who can then 
intervene. One of these forces mentioned similar strategies with Environmental 
Health and Trading Standards.  
 
 A participant in one force mentioned the use of Community Protection Notices under 
the Anti-Social, Crime and Policing Act of 2014. 20 These can be used to disrupt 
behaviour that is having a negative impact on members of the public.  
 
 A participant in one force described the use of exclusion orders, particularly in 
relation to suspects frequenting local children’s homes.  
 
 Finally, a participant noted their force makes general improvements to the safety of 
locations, such as improved lighting and CCTV:  
 
                                            
 
20
 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/12/notes/division/5/4 
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You also might need to get some lighting because this particular location is 
quite dark. So lighting might assist because they won't hang around if it's 
brightly lit. There's numerous things we can do so solve that sort of issue, if 
that makes sense? (C3-3) 
 
4.10 Not all disruption techniques were known to police participants. One, for example, was 
unaware of the community protection notices under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime 
and Policing Act 2014 although he was interested in learning more about them. Other 
disruption strategies were not perceived to be relevant in the local context:  
 I'm aware there's Hotel Orders that can be used, and this came out on the regional 
profile. One of the things that was… questioned [was] why haven't [our force] got the 
issues in budget hotels like other places. We haven't got that many of that kind of 
hotel, you know the [hotel – anonymised] etc. Certainly at [town] where it's bed and 
breakfast family-run premises I can't imagine they'd use that as a base for CSE 
because you've got to answer to the landlady and if you turn up as a 45-year-old man 
with a young girl in tow, you're more likely to get reported. So we haven't had any 
hotels where we do the Hotel Order type thing, but I'm aware it exists. Equally the 
taxi situation hasn’t been one of our main issues. (F6-2)  
Intelligence and disruption 
4.11 Good intelligence is central to developing and directing effective disruption strategies 
(College of Policing, 2017). In fact, when most participants discussed disruption it went 
hand in hand with acknowledgement of the intelligence picture that drives it. Disruption 
is often determined by information developed within intelligence units or by specialist 
intelligence officers: 
 
 Our intelligence officer that we’ve got within CSE has a very strong background in 
intelligence work and he’s developed a specific form for our partners to fill in which is 
really prescriptive. There is free text but it’s very prescriptive in terms of guiding them 
through what it is that we’re looking for, that can help us build that picture and what’s 
going with these young people and how can we disrupt this behaviour. So yes, there 
is definitely a flow back into the system. (E5-2) 
4.12 Neighbourhood policing teams, with their knowledge of the local people and local 
context, were recognised by participants to be good sources of intelligence for disruption 
strategies:  
 
 Operation [X] was a CSE investigation… the neighbourhood team were crucial to that 
intelligence gathering and flagging up the actual issue in the first place, which 
resulted in a number of males being arrested and dealt with for sexual offences and 
rape of young girls… so I think without the neighbourhood teams, we wouldn’t have 
known that was going on unless they’d flagged the referral through a third party 
agency or they’d gone missing. But none of these girls had gone missing, they were 
just hanging around the off licence. (A1-3)  
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4.13 Covert surveillance is being used to good effect in some forces to gather intelligence on 
hot spots:  
 
 We've seen some brilliant results there. The ability to use covert policing tactics in 
terms of undercover deployment, surveillance, deployments have seen some brilliant 
results as well. I mean all of this is evidence based, you know we've got conviction 
after conviction from covert operations. (D4-2) 
4.14 Intelligence may be generated from missing episodes and the missing from home 
interviews that take place following such episodes. In one force, missing from home 
coordinators are specifically tasked with generating intelligence:  
 
 What we've been piloting since the 1st September within [force] is we have our 
missing from home coordinators if it's appropriate will do a joint visit with the 
allocated social worker for that particular young person. The focus of the missing 
from home coordinator is to look at problem solving, but also to gather intelligence 
around where that young person's been and who they've been with. To look at any 
potential avenue for disruption. For example, whether that be harbouring notices for a 
particular adult who's having contact. (C3-4) 
4.15 Parents were recognised by some participants as important sources of intelligence:  
 Yes, I would say that parents are involved in disruptions I know previously from 
young people that I’ve worked with, parents have been quite pro in terms of feeding 
intelligence into our system. (E5-3) 
4.16 Decision making around the use of disruption techniques was described by some 
participants as dynamic and bespoke to the particular situation presenting itself:  
 
 It's on a case by case level focused around problem solving. (C3-2) 
 I think it’s on a case by case basis, I think you're looking at the investigation and then 
also what disruption opportunity we’ve got but it is driven very much by the tasking 
process as well... that’s the whole ethos around it, about how we can disrupt it and 
think about alternative ways of tackling the issue, as opposed to solely from a CSE 
perspective. (A1-2) 
4.17 Both police and voluntary sector agency respondents have a role to play in disruption.  
There was a general sense, however, of a division of labour among participants whereby 
police focus disruption activity on perpetrators and locations, while their partner 
agencies focus on prevention activities with victims, children and young people at risk 
and the community, as acknowledged by this voluntary sector participant:  
 
 The other thing for me, where I sit, is in terms of tackling CSE is I think a lot of 
emphasis at… [multi-agency] level is placed on disruption and on prosecution, which 
obviously is very important but we need to remember that’s just part of the jigsaw. 
Again, it’s variable, but I think police need to understand they’ve got a role but other 
people have got a role as well, social care, CSE workers like myself, and it’s just as 
important as part of the jigsaw that all of those things slot into place and sometimes 
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actually their response to CSE is sometimes just police led and it needs to be 
understood that sometimes an approach like that doesn’t always work. It might drive 
it underground is my point. (D4-1 stakeholder) 
4.18 Such prevention activity was specifically understood to be ‘disruption work’.  This is 
significant because it underscores the important types of ‘soft intelligence’ that partner 
agencies are likely to be holding on perpetrators that can inform police disruption activity 
with perpetrators and at locations. The CSE regional networks have been developing 
gateways to facilitate more and better sharing of this kind of intelligence with the police.    
 
4.19 One way partner agencies contribute to disruption is through provision of intelligence 
through multi-agency forums. Intelligence can inform policing and/or multi-agency 
decisions about disruption, as this police participant describes:  
 
Every two to three weeks, [colleague] chairs a CSE tasking meeting which fits in with 
the general national intelligence model way of working, around tasking and 
coordinating. Partner agencies are invited to that and the purpose of that meeting is 
to look at intelligence and information that we’ve got around offenders and locations 
primarily, as opposed to victims because we pick up the victim stuff through the 
referrals… So what’s the intelligence telling us about the offenders and locations, so 
that we can take action against them, whether that’s disruption or enforcement? (A1-
1) 
 
4.20 The following voluntary sector participant describes a more direct role in disruption, 
reflecting their focus on community awareness of CSE:  
 
So we will go out on joint visits with licensing staff, and we’re doing some training for 
licensed taxi drivers, those kinds of things... but… in terms of direct disruption 
intervention with perpetrators, that’s still with the police. There’s disruption around 
awareness raising and that kind of thing, but in actual direct disruption… it’s the 
police. (A1-1 stakeholder) 
 
4.21 Police participants confirmed the value of intervention work undertaken by partners with 
children and young people as part of important early disruption activity:  
 
Health plays a key role around linking with schools, making sure we have different 
approach to children around getting them at the best time, to try to put that 
intervention in and disruption in with them. Within each strategy meeting around the 
child on the CSE plan, there will be disruption work within there which is overseen 
and directed by the child protection manager as well. (A1-2) 
 
4.22 Certain partnerships provide the police with additional leverage in accessing premises, 
as described by this police participant:  
 
They do take quite a heavy role (partners)… Especially licensing because that gives 
us that opportunity to go in and think about it from a different perspective. So 
licensing plays a key role. (A1-3)  
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4.23 Resources appeared to be the most significant challenge to carrying out disruption 
activity. Some disruption activity is resource-intensive, requiring follow up and monitoring 
for it to be useful (for example, monitoring whether CAWNs are breached). A participant 
in one CSE team said they struggled to monitor the activity themselves and found it hard 
to draft in additional help:  
 
So if we go out and we serve half a dozen Section 2s say a month, or whatever we 
would serve, just if we just looked at it from ourselves, how do we then go about 
testing the compliance of that? So that’s where we would bring in the Neighbourhood 
Police Team, we bring in Social Services, we bring in everybody else to try and do it, 
but you don’t get the same level of buy in, because they’re all busy doing their own 
thing, so testing compliance… that’s difficult. (H8-4) 
 
4.24 In the context of rising reports of CSA/E and increasing identification, it is likely that 
forces will be prioritising limited resources to respond to reactive investigations. This 
means that this kind of proactive disruption activity may receive less focus and attention.   
 
4.25 Disruption was also said to be difficult because identifying suspects is challenging. 
Many of them use nicknames and aliases which can make them hard to locate. Police 
participants also said that disruption work could be hampered by the complex nature of 
CSE and their inability to always engage young people. This reduces their ability to 
gather the needed intelligence to direct disruption work. Finally, police participants 
shared anxieties that their disruption work simply moves the risky or abusive activity 
elsewhere. For example, patrolling hotspots caused this participant anxiety:  
 
 The only difficulty with that and one of my bugbears with this is by putting uniform in 
to, say, a park, and because we've got some intelligence to say we may have 
children congregating there. Say early adult males coming in cars, that kind of 
obvious approach to CSE. My only concern is we then disrupt it… it moves on then 
you have to disrupt that too. It's a really difficult one when it's say ‘do we target a 
CSE hot spot?’ because you have the risk of number one sending it underground 
and number two you have the difficulty where you may then force those children to a 
completely different area that we're not aware of. (A8-2) 
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Investigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Messages 
 Problem profiles on CSE exist in all eight study forces, although not all key 
personnel working on CSE were aware of them. Consideration should be given 
to raising the profile of these documents to all relevant policing staff working 
within the CSE response.   
 The process of compiling profiles is complex and challenging, and not all 
participants felt that they were useful in their present state.  
 Participants made particular reference to the need for profiles to help them 
understand what is driving the patterns of CSE observed; that a description of 
patterns is not enough (and is often what they know already).   
 Most commonly, sharing and receiving data from partner agencies to populate 
the problem profiles is hampered by structural issues and organisational culture.  
 Not all of the CSE teams had dedicated analytical support for developing 
problem profiles. Forces should consider dedicating resources to an analyst who 
is trained and knowledgeable in CSE, can effectively capture multi-agency data 
and intelligence, and who understands partnership contexts and landscapes.  
 Participants provided some examples of what they are doing to overcome some 
of the challenges. Given the centrality of problem profiles for understanding 
CSE, forces would benefit from an evaluation of some of these practices and a 
channel for sharing this activity across forces.     
 
 
Key Messages 
Problem profiles 
 Problem profiles on CSE exist in all eight study forces, although not all key 
personnel working on CSE were aware of them. Consideration should be given 
to raising the profile of these documents to all relevant policing staff working 
within the CSE response.   
 The process of compiling profiles is complex and challenging, and not all 
participants felt that they were useful in their present state.  
 Participants made particular reference to the need for profiles to help them 
understand what is driving the patterns of CSE observed; that a description of 
patterns is not enough (and is often what they know already).   
 Most commonly, sharing and receiving data from partner agencies to populate 
the problem profiles is hampered by structural issues and organisational culture.  
 Not all of the CSE teams had dedicated analytical support for developing 
problem profiles. Forces should consider dedicating resources to an analyst who 
is trained and knowledgeable in CSE, can effectively capture multi-agency data 
and intelligence, and who understands partnership contexts and landscapes.  
 Participants provided some examples of what they are doing to overcome some 
of the challenges. Given the centrality of problem profiles for understanding 
CSE, forces would benefit from an evaluation of some of these practices and a 
channel for sharing this activity across forces.   
Material and information   
 Gathering third-party material is an essential part of a CSE investigation, as 
emphasised in the Authorised Professional Practice. Best practice guidance 
also highlights the important role of partner agencies in providing this material to 
police (Beckett et al., 2017).  
 Police describe the process of gathering third-party material as hugely time and 
resource intensive. Forces should ensure appropriate levels of resources are 
supporting this aspect of investigations.  
 Police recognise that gathering third-party material is invasive and can be 
distressing to young people in the investigation and court process. Appropriate 
levels of support and information need to be made available to young people in 
relation to the use of third-party material.  
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4.26 The College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice (CoP, 2013) recommends that 
CSE investigations should: 
 be proactive to explore the nature and patterns of sexual exploitation locally.  
 involve sharing of information about those at risk and potential offenders with 
partners.  
 involve early liaison with the Crown Prosecution Service at the earliest opportunity to 
seek appropriate advice in order to help outline an effective investigation strategy.   
 
Problem profiling  
4.27 Understanding the nature and patterns of sexual exploitation locally is essential to 
proactive policing (CoP, 2017). One way of achieving this is through an activity referred 
to as ‘problem profiling’. The College of Policing code of practice intelligence 
management processes detail the purposes of a problem profile, which are to:  
 “provide detail on crime trends or hot spots that require greater analysis than can be 
provided in the tactical assessment.21  
                                            
 
21
 The tactical assessment is used to identify the short-term issues for consideration by the tactical 
tasking and coordination group. It should be used to draw inferences and make recommendations for 
prevention, intelligence, enforcement and reassurance priorities, and future policing activity. See 
College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice on Intelligence Management for more detail: 
Relationships with CPS 
 Some police participants told us that they have had positive engagement with 
the CPS in relation to third-party material and that, in some areas, the CPS is no 
longer averse to using third-party material and is knowledgeable about how to 
develop an effective prosecution strategy.    
 The relationship between the police and the CPS varied significantly across the 
study forces.    
 Police participants noted that it could be difficult to get consistent and swift 
advice from the CPS.  
 Where relationships with the CPS were described more negatively, it was 
usually in relation to structural changes in CPS that have changed the nature of 
relationships. These include: resourcing cuts to the CPS; the introduction of a 
National CPS helpline, local offices moving out of the area.  
 These changes have led to inconsistent advice coming from the CPS and 
lengthy waiting periods for responses.   
 Our police participants acknowledged that the CPS/RASSO lawyers are 
increasingly informed about the patterns and dynamics of CSE and, as a result, 
have, themselves, greater confidence in cases.   
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 provide a vehicle for the application of one or more analytical techniques to a 
problem.  
 assist in subject identification and selection (suspects or victims).  
 assist in prioritisation.  
 identify intelligence gaps.  
 highlight prevention, intelligence, enforcement and reassurance opportunities.  
 provide justification for actions.” (CoP, 2013). 
4.28 The College of Policing code of practice on intelligence management advises that the 
problem profile must be current and relevant. It should be added to and updated until the 
problem is dealt with, then stored for retrieval if necessary.  Best practice guidance 
recommendations and research on CSE also highlight the importance of a good, up-to-
date local problem profile (Beckett et al., 2017; Berelowitz et al., 2013; DfE, 2017, 
Beckett & Pearce 2018 forthcoming).  
4.29 Appendix 5 of the Office of the Children’s Commissioner’s report on CSE in gangs and 
groups offers specific guidance on problem profiling CSE, including: establishing terms 
of reference; outlining a data collection plan; formulating an information requirement; 
collating data; monitoring progress; reporting issues and challenges to the Local 
Children Safeguarding Board ; analysing the data; and writing a problem profile to be 
disseminated across partner agencies. Importantly, a dedicated, knowledgeable analyst 
(knowledgeable in CSE, partnership contexts and collating complex data from multiple 
agencies) is required to produce high-quality problem profiles (Berelowitz et al., 2013).   
4.30 The evidence from this research suggests that forces may be struggling to create 
quality CSE problem profiles, highlighting the complex and challenging nature of this 
work. As a result, some police participants in this research did not always perceive them 
to be useful.   
4.31 At least one participant in each of the eight study forces was aware of the existence of 
a problem profile for CSE within their forces. Not all participants were aware of them, 
however, raising questions about how far these profiles are actively used and 
disseminated to key officers working within the police CSE response.  
4.31 Participants explained that, in theory, problem profiles are useful, but their usefulness 
depends on their quality. They acknowledged particular benefits of problem profiles, 
which include that:  
 They identify gaps in knowledge about patterns of CSE. 
 They highlight hot spots and other locations of concern. 
                                                                                                                                       
 
https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/intelligence-management/intelligence-
products/#tactical-assessment 
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 They inform tactical planning. 
 They inform information gathering from partners.  
 
4.32 Our police participants noted, however, that creating problem profiles is difficult and the 
quality can be hampered by particular data challenges.  
 
4.33 Most commonly, participants said that gathering data across different partner agencies 
is complex. There are different systems in place within and across agencies and partners 
are located across different geographic locations. For this reason, it is important to have 
a highly skilled analyst, as noted above. For participants in this study, and in the absence 
of dedicated analytical support, these structural problems mean that problem profiles 
take a considerable time to develop, have gaps in information and quickly go out of date.   
 We can provide a police picture to our partners, but I think there is room for 
improvement there where our multi-agencies can add to that profile picture. They're 
giving me a more accurate profile, but because of different sorts of data systems, 
different people in different local authorities with different drives, different 
responsibilities, collating that information does prove difficult. For example our 
missing from home coordinators have local authority analysts come in and use our 
systems to extract data for their purposes, just to try to get the most accurate picture.  
But that has proved problematic. We commissioned six monthly profiles for each 
local authority quite recently actually, and I had a look at them, I had concerns that 
they didn’t reflect the specific issues. (D4-1) 
4.34 The gap between the policy definition of CSE and how offences are categorised 
appeared problematic for developing an up-to-date and accurate problem profile at both 
local and regional levels:  
 …we have got the LSCB a problem profile created… We’ve [also] got a regional 
strategic governance group and the regional police produced a profile. How helpful 
do I think it is? I don’t think it’s particularly helpful if I’m honest. There's a myriad of 
different types of offences that could be and can be construed as child sexual 
exploitation. It's really difficult to pull off which offences are child sexual exploitation 
and which aren't child sexual exploitation. (D4-2) 
4.35 Poor data accuracy within forces, poor recording practices and inconsistent flagging of 
CSE cases meant that many forces were unable to retrieve accurate data or complete 
information needed to develop a problem profile. 
 For example, an incident could be opened, a concern for a female could be opened 
with a sexual exploitation flag, we could then crime whatever happened with a sexual 
exploitation flag and then we’d put a child concern notification if they were a child or 
an adult concern notification if they were an adult, with a flag. So you’d end up 
getting three flags for just one incident so our data wasn’t very accurate either. (D4-1) 
4.36 As a result of these challenges, some forces stated that problem profiles were 
incomplete, inaccurate or out of date and therefore not useful. Some suggested that 
problem profiles only showed them what information they already knew or provided 
limited support in tackling CSE.  
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4.37 However, several interviewees offered solutions to these challenges, including: 
 Quarterly analysis of victims and hotspots – Instead of developing a yearly problem 
profile, quarterly profiles were thought to ensure that information is current, easier to 
digest and more accurate.  
 One problem profile per local authority – Some forces fall across several different 
local authority areas and as such have multiple agencies and partners that feed 
information in. It was thought that developing one problem profile per local authority 
would minimise some of the difficulties of developing profiles from multiple sources 
and would ensure the profiles are more accessible and relevant. 
 Simplifying questionnaires to partners – Streamlining the information sourced by 
multi-agency partners and simplifying the information requested could ensure that 
more information is shared. 
Summary  
4.38 The 2016 Joint Targeted Area Inspections recognise the importance of problem 
profiling but that its success may be determined by the amount of investment the police 
can make into this area of business (for example, a dedicated analyst) and the quality of 
contributions made by multi-agency partners to the profile building process. In most of 
the force areas, there was no dedicated, skilled analytical support readily available and 
interviews with police highlighted the significant challenges they face in collating 
information from their partner agencies. It is essential to build a picture of what is going 
on across forces to improve the quality, accuracy and usefulness of problem profiling, 
given that they are considered such an essential component of a good CSE response.    
Material and information  
4.38 Child sexual exploitation Authorised Professional Practice advises investigators of CSE 
to obtain relevant material from partner agencies and third parties as soon as possible in 
the investigation. The guidance notes that third-party material can help to find 
corroborative evidence to support or disprove allegations. This can include observations 
by carers relating to changes in the victim’s behaviour or evidence of grooming (eg, 
receiving gifts) but can also come from other sources, eg, 999 tapes, house-to-house 
enquiries or photographs.   
4.39 Gathering third-party materials was acknowledged by police participants to be a 
laborious and resource-intensive part of investigations that can take a very long time to 
complete:  
 That relates to investigations before the court were required to explore the history of 
victims... So that will involve looking at the other agencies that they've been engaged 
with, for example local authority if they're looked-after care, health records and to see 
if there's any undermining material within that material. We've got to do that now, 
which is a significant and massive resource asked of the police. For example, I had a 
dedicated team of a DS and six DCs of my involvement team dedicated to third party 
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disclosure alone. That is a clearly significant issue that’s reflected across the country. 
(D4-3) 
 Third-party material, that can take a long time to get. (F6-2)   
 
 Third-party material can be a minefield and it’s generally a really big job. So yes, it 
can play quite a great part in a case. If you’ve got a young person who’s been 
involved with a lot of services over a long period of time, we go through that third-
party material with a fine tooth comb looking for anything that can support or 
undermine our case. It’s a significant job to undertake when you have a CSE case… 
it’s definitely something that can play quite a large part in an investigation in terms of 
manpower hours. (E5-3)  
4.40 One participant was particularly frustrated at a general perception that obtaining third-
party material is straightforward:  
I don’t mean to be disrespectful, but when I read the protocol I think the first couple of 
paragraphs, the author… specifically says it's not supposed to be an onerous 
process. It just dominates our enquiries. (D4-3) 
4.41 There was a real sense of frustration about the use of third-party material among some 
of the police participants, highlighting a lack of equality between victims and 
perpetrators. This frustration is clearly evident in the following quote:  
 It's frustrating because we have to get the third-party material for the victim, but the 
offender obviously [it] doesn’t matter what they've done also in the past. The girls that 
are most vulnerable and the most susceptible to CSE are likely to have had things 
happen in the past that might muddy the waters... I think it's the Youth and Criminal 
Justice Act of 1999 or whatever said that a victim of rape couldn't be questioned 
about their previous sexual conduct. Yet for children who come to us as victims of 
CSE, we trawl over whether once when they were at primary school, they were 8, 
they told a lie about having a pencil case stolen. You know it seems a bit like that. It 
seems a bit unfair. I understand that they have a right to a fair trial and they have 
issues with perpetrators. For instance, one of the cases we had, the offender 
admitted having sexual intercourse with the girl, who was 12 at the time. But he said 
he thought she was 16… So the issue in that case is her age and whether he knew 
she was that age. So why do we need to look at whether she tells lies or not and her 
third-party material, why is that relevant? It's not relevant, she had had a complex life 
and she’d been in and out of care and had difficulties with her family etc., etc., etc. Is 
that relevant? I don’t think it is and I don’t think it's fair. (F6-2) 
4.42 The above quote also alludes to the problematic nature of third-party material and the 
impact this can have on a case. However, our participants painted a general picture of 
good understanding among CPS Rape and Serious Sexual Offences unit (RASSO) 
lawyers of CSE victims’ contexts which, at least for some, meant that the lawyers were 
more comfortable engaging with third-party material:    
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  [Third party material is] not a blocker, I think CPS are happier to run it, because they 
see the problems that the girls have got… we've got all this other undermining stuff in 
her history, but I'm pretty sure CPS would be happy to run that, because they can 
explain away this undermining stuff. You know she was in a bad place, she was 
doing this, she was very vulnerable. However… we've got good supporting evidence 
and it's corroborated and it's credible, so let's give it a run. (B2-4) 
4.43 There was insightful recognition of 1) issues of credibility that come with use of third-
party material and b) the additional trauma and distress young people can be faced with 
during a trial as a result. Police participants in one force described an explicit strategy for 
investigating that they believe a) addresses the concern that a young person’s credibility 
may be in jeopardy and b) recognises the invasiveness of obtaining third-party material 
and the impact this has on young people. They attempt, where possible, to investigate 
and prosecute cases involving more than one victim so that a) the vulnerability of all 
victims is emphasised rather than an individual young person’s situation and b) the 
young person is not on their own.   
 Actually the underlying material that comes out of that can be extremely difficult for 
young people to deal with within a court environment. So victim accounts, in the main 
supported by what we get from mobile devices, what we can show in terms of 
association. And our prosecution strategy, which tends to try and group victims 
together and charge people with conspiracy offences or join indictments, so what we 
don’t end up with is one victim in court standing alone with underlying material 
against her. We try to build a picture of multiple victims and use their underlying 
material to show a picture of vulnerability. Rather than face the heavy attrition rate of 
sexual offence investigation, especially if you've got a young person who has 
disclosed underlying material. So… we were on board from day one with our 
Complex Case Unit at the CPS designing our prosecution strategy and appointing a 
disclosure barrister who’s been with us from day one. (D4-2)    
Summary 
4.44 Gathering material and information, including third-party material, is an essential 
component of a CSE investigation. Our police participants saw this as one of the most 
time- and resource-intensive processes in investigations. They recognised the sensitivity 
of third-party material and the impact this can have on young people. Some participants 
noted positive outcomes in the use of third-party material by the CPS, where RASSO 
lawyers were knowledgeable and skilled in understanding and prosecuting CSE cases.   
 
Relationship with CPS 
4.45 The CPS, in their guidelines on prosecuting CSA cases, recommends early 
consultation between the police and CPS so that early advice can be provided to the 
police:  
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The decision to involve the CPS at an early stage is a matter for the police but 
experience has shown that early CPS involvement can help address some of the 
evidential or presentational issues that may arise at a later stage of the case (CPS, 
2013)  
4.46 The relationship between the police and the CPS varied significantly across the study 
forces. Police participants in two forces described broadly positive relationships 
established with the CPS. In three other forces, participants described their relationship 
with the CPS in broadly negative terms. In the remaining three forces, police 
relationships with CPS appeared to be mixed.   
4.47 The following account of these relationships isolates those things that characterise 
good and difficult relationships between the CPS and police, as portrayed by our police 
participants.   
4.48 Two key characteristics appeared to positively influence the perceived nature of 
relationships between the police and CPS: the RASSO lawyers’ knowledge of CSE and 
established, regular police contact with CPS/RASSO lawyers.  
4.49 Our police participants highlighted the importance of working with knowledgeable 
RASSO lawyers who understand the complexities of CSE and the impact it has on 
victims. This knowledge has not always come immediately, but was described as 
‘evolving’ in similar ways that it has for the police. Importantly, police participants 
recognised that a culture change is occurring in the CPS in relation to CSE:  
I recently had a prosecutor… he couldn’t have put it better, it was like I’d written it 
myself, he clearly understood that yes, although the female victim had… gone and 
got in this car and she had done X, Y and Z, the prosecutor in black and white clearly 
said, “these victims won’t always act like we expect people to act, and it is by that 
very nature that makes them so vulnerable”. So that was a really welcome response 
and it was really nice to see that maybe there is a culture change coming with the 
CPS as much as with the police. (E5-3) 
4.50 Another police participant in a different force described a similar example:  
We’ve evolved together with third-party material. At one point, we always had that 
battle that the victim was so badly undermined with third-party material that we could 
not get the case off the ground. We’ve evolved around that, CPS have evolved and 
that’s a journey we’ve been on together and should be celebrated in that CPS no 
longer look at the third-party material as so problematic that they won’t consider. 
They understand now that they [CSE victims] are life’s most vulnerable people [and] 
will have attracted a whole load of third-party material because of their involvement 
with social care and being looked after and all that kind of thing, that there’s almost 
evidence if you like of sexual exploitation, so they don’t look at it too harshly now and 
that’s far better. We’ve got a far better relationship with them in the sexual 
exploitation arena than we’ve ever had. (D4-1)  
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4.51 Regular communication and contact with the CPS was also cited by our police 
participants as important for developing good relationships, and was evidenced in a 
number of interviews. This aligns with the CPS guidance on prosecuting CSA cases 
where it is recommended that, particularly for complex cases, regular case review 
meetings are held between the police and the CPS:  
Our DCI meets with the head of that RASSO team on a monthly basis just to talk 
through issues and things. We deal with the RASSO team all the time, so we know 
the lawyers by name and we meet them quite regularly and we kind of know which 
way they’re thinking and whether they think the case is a runner or not. So I would 
say that because of that, we obviously have a lot better rapport. (B2-4) 
4.52 Where good relationships with CPS were described by our police participants, they 
highlighted the mutually beneficial nature of early engagement. Police benefit by 
receiving early input on what approach to take and the CPS benefit from having early 
knowledge of what cases would be taken to them, allowing them to develop their 
prosecutions strategies early on.  
4.53 Not all relationships between the CPS and the police worked so well. The most 
common issue that confounded this relationship was a perceived lack of engagement by 
the CPS with the police. Our police participants recognised the structural and resource 
issues faced by the CPS however:  
The CPS aren’t engaging strategically and organisationally in terms of developing the 
theme because they’re struggling to do so because they’re a regional unit and there’s 
two authorities in [our force area]. Times that at least by five, they’d have to go to 10 
different sets of meetings to satisfy every local authority and we struggle as well. The 
problem is there’s too many cooks spoiling the broth a bit. (A1-2) 
4.54 Our police participants also recognised the impact of financial and resource cuts within 
the CPS, which they believed have had an impact on the availability of CPS lawyers. 
Structural changes to the CPS – the introduction of a national CPS direct line, for 
example – have negatively impacted on the development of local relationships between 
the police and the CPS and on police obtaining consistent advice:  
I think the CPS have suffered a lot of cuts, as everyone else has as well. It’s not as 
easy to get hold of them, especially now when it’s a national CPS direct line, you 
don’t always get consistent advice. It was obviously a lot better when you have local 
bonds... But I think the CPS are going through, like every other agency, a challenging 
time with significant reductions in resources. (C3-2) 
4.55 Changes to the ways in which the CPS work and their accessibility also appear to be 
hampering the development of good relationships with the police:  
The problem with personal relationships with CPS, they are as low as I can recall in 
my career because they’re not here. They used to be in a police station, but they’re 
now satellite off at [city]. Sometimes if we’re dealing with a RASSO lawyer and they 
aren’t available, they could be anywhere and it’s all done by phone and email and 
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new systems have been put in place to share that paperwork in a different way. (H8-
4)  
4.56 The resourcing issue is also perceived to have an impact on the length of time it takes 
to obtain advice, raising anxieties that victims may withdraw their support for 
investigations:  
They just say “our target is 28 days” and just consistently fail to deliver on that. So 
we’re looking at four months plus for final turnaround, which is really not good victim 
service, is it? (G7-1) 
Summary 
4.57 The relationship between the police and the CPS is critical for preparing an early 
investigation strategy that is capable of building robust evidence with the best chances 
for a successful prosecution. We did not, in this research, have the opportunity to 
interview the CPS to better understand their perspectives on the way in which the police 
engage with them and so we only have a partial picture of the challenges that exist.  
However, the police participants said that it is primarily structural changes to the CPS 
that have hindered the ability of the police to develop good relationships and obtain 
consistent and early advice. Where this works, there are good local relationships and 
frequent meetings between the police and the CPS.   
Prosecution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.58 One of the initial objectives in this research was to assess how far particular ‘models’ of 
CSE responses in police forces might be linked to prosecution outcomes. Our findings 
related to policing data and recording revealed that the data is currently not good 
enough to inform an understanding of how police responses relate to the scale and 
success of prosecutions. Our interviews with police participants revealed a broad lack of 
understanding of prosecution success or otherwise. However, interviews provided some 
rich data on the perspectives of police staff on CSE prosecution.   
Key Messages 
 Forces should urgently improve their flagging practices around CSE in order to 
identify and track how many cases detected go on to be prosecuted.  
 The police and the CPS should be considering ways to join up data recording 
systems. At present the systems are fractured and it is very challenging to track 
CSE cases in police systems through the court outcomes. A solution could be an 
additional field on the CPS system which details the crime unique reference number 
from the originating crime report. This would allow records across both systems to 
be easily matched and prosecution outcomes tracked. 
 Victimless prosecutions are not seen as a viable strategy in all forces. Forces would 
benefit from guidance that includes practice examples.  
 
 70 
 
4.59 Most of our police participants were unaware of how many CSE cases had been 
prosecuted, what proportion were successful and if prosecutions for CSE were 
increasing. Anecdotally, our participants felt that prosecutions were increasing but were 
unable to offer definitive statistics to support their perceptions. The difficulty with crime 
recording systems, variations in recording offences and the range of offences used to 
prosecute mean that it is difficult to know with certainty. Despite this, there is some 
evidence that systems may be improving in the future in some forces:   
I can't run the programme on our crime recording system to say how many CSE 
cases were successful at court and convicted prior to 2010 and how many now, 
because that’s not how any of its recorded, which is a frustration. We do now flag 
instances on [system] where we say there's a CSE element. So going forward you'd 
be able to pull those instances off by running a search on our crime recording 
system. (F6-2) 
Because it would say for example rape is rape, it isn’t CSE rape. So because we 
don't have those actual markers within how we record and how we go through the 
court process, it's very difficult to quantify how many go through the process. (H8-2) 
Again, anecdotally, there has been increased activity over the last two years, so yes 
there is a feeling that there’s an increase in CSE prosecution and again, with… the 
work in the community, there’s several strategies in place like there was just a 
closure of a premises today… I know it’s a bit of a woolly answer but in short, I think 
it’s increasing but I couldn't give you the statistic. (A1-3)  
I don't know is the honest answer to that. I know that the ones that we've had in here 
and had involvement in we've had some good results. But overall I don't know if it's 
increased or decreased. (E5-1) 
4.60 While our police participants acknowledged that CSE prosecutions are difficult to 
secure because of problems in gathering robust evidence for trial, particularly in non-
recent cases, they were still seen as important in helping victims:  
The more historical they are the less likely you can get a conviction just because of 
the evidence. But that I think still does not stop us from investigating those because 
that process of investigation and hearing the story of those victims who may now be 
adults, they're coming forward as adults because they feel confident or they feel they 
can report it now. Their being heard does have a positive impact on them, that at 
least their story's been heard even though there may not be a conviction at the end 
of it. In balance that still is a very worthwhile thing to do. (A1-1) 
4.61 We explored, with police participants, their perceptions on and use of ‘evidence-based 
prosecutions’ that go forward in the absence of victim cooperation with the 
investigations. These have been typically used in cases of domestic violence, and there 
has been some evidence emerging through the International Centre’s wider work with 
police that these are being increasingly considered in cases of CSE. Our interview with 
police participants evidenced variation among forces in their use and perceptions of 
these types of prosecutions.   
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4.62Participants in three forces told us there had been successful victimless prosecutions, 
as described in this quote:  
 Yes… we had one child who was 15, the chap I believe was about 47 and she’d 
become friends with his daughter and that was the link in relation to that. We worked 
on securing underwear covertly with the consent of the girl’s parents. In the 
meantime, we served an abduction notice, he was arrested and charged with a child 
abduction, released from court following remand and then we went covert with it, 
then he got further arrested on abduction and he was seen kissing so was sexual 
activity and that’s when the semen came back on the underwear and he was later 
charged with an additional sexual activity. (A1-2)  
4.63 A participant in one of the forces that has seen success in this area told us they 
proceed with victimless prosecutions even if victims are engaged with the investigation. 
They recognise that the court process can be very traumatic and harmful for young 
people and if the evidence is robust enough, a victimless prosecution can protect the 
young people from having to go through this process.   
4.64 Developing a victimless prosecution strategy could, in the long run, lead to engagement 
of the victim:  
 We ran it as a victimless prosecution because the evidence was so overwhelming 
and she didn’t want to give evidence but she did realise at the end and that chap got 
about four to five years. She came on board and given a statement so it’s probably 
not a true representation but I suppose the key message is they often start out as 
victimless prosecutions and you put the work in with them, until such a time as 
they’re prepared to talk. (A1-2) 
4.65 The success of victimless prosecutions was said to hinge on the strength of the 
evidence. Having strong evidence, particularly genetic evidence, could support a 
victimless prosecution. Particularly strong evidence was said to be underwear with 
semen in it, which is seen as irrefutable evidence but requires parental consent to gather 
and use in this way. Mobile phone evidence also appeared to be particularly useful. 
4.66 Participants in the remaining study forces reported not having used the approach or 
that they had been unsuccessful in obtaining them. The quote from the following 
participant highlights that some police do not consider that victimless prosecutions are 
even possible:  
 No victimless prosecutions for sexual offences, because they just can't happen. We 
have obviously looked to target the offender’s additional criminality, so where we 
have not been able to successfully prosecute somebody for sexual exploitation, I've 
prosecuted them for drugs supply or the possession of firearms. We've got notable 
successes there, lots of good successes where we've targeted additional criminality.  
But no victimless and as far as I'm aware you won't get a victimless prosecution for a 
sexual offence, just because you have to have somebody who said they didn’t 
consent to that. (D4-2) 
4.67 Participants in another force were more amenable to trying victimless prosecutions 
although they had not yet been successful:  
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 No, tried a couple, got a couple in the pipeline where the girl won’t give an ABE but 
she’s 12. We’ve got DNA, so we’re having a go at that. (G7-4)   
Summary 
4.68 The interviews demonstrated a significant amount of activity in relation to disrupting and 
investigating CSE cases. Yet, unfortunately, forces are struggling to evidence the 
outcomes of all of this work. Substantive improvement in data recording and data 
systems are necessary if forces are to evidence the outcomes of their CSE responses. 
The Home Office requirement for force data to be returned on CSE-flagged cases will, 
hopefully, assist in focusing improvements to data recording. The next step in improving 
data recording is, however, down to forces to implement and achieve. This section also 
presented some information on victimless prosecution approaches, which have shown 
success in some forces, while other forces are either less aware of how they can 
successfully be obtained or have struggled to achieve them. Forces would benefit from 
sharing successes and failures with other forces through a forum such as the College of 
Policing’s POLKA (Police OnLine Knowledge Area) platform or through the production of 
national guidance that details strategies and offers case studies as examples.  
Supporting young people  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.69 The latest national guidance on responding to CSE states that:  
When specific concerns are identified about child sexual exploitation, it is critical that 
children and young people receive the services they need, delivered in a way that 
recognises the complexity of their situation and maximises the likelihood of 
Key Messages 
 As the models presented in Section 2 show, approaches to supporting young 
people vary across forces.   
 One force described handing all of the responsibility for supporting young 
people to partner agencies (‘partner-led approach’). Police recognised the skill 
and expertise of partner agencies and felt this approach gave them (police) 
more time to investigate. While the recognised value of partner agencies is 
welcome, it raises questions about resourcing for the third sector and about how 
police can develop their skills in working with young people.   
 Another approach to supporting young people can be described as ‘multi-
agency’, which appeared to represent a more equal balance of responsibility in 
supporting young people across sectors and services.   
 A third approach observed was a ‘police-led approach’ where police took on 
responsibility for this work, drawing on the input of partner agencies in ad hoc 
ways. Forces that take this approach should consider formalising a strategic, 
carefully thought-through approach to this work, given the importance of 
supporting victims through what can be a re-traumatising process.   
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engagement. All such practice should be underpinned by a commitment to upholding 
children’s rights in line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
This includes a child/young person’s Article 12 right to have a say on matters that 
affect them in accordance with their evolving capacity. (Beckett et al., 2017; p. 30)  
4.70 There is, at present, no robust evidence base that would recommend a particular model 
of police support for young people over another. There are however, general principles 
for working with and supporting young people identified in the latest Department for 
Education (2017) guidance that should be evident in practice, whatever the model. 
Below, three general models of supporting young people are presented that capture 
broad approaches across the eight forces. Following this, both the challenges to 
supporting young people and good practice – as measured against the general 
principles in the guidance – will be considered.   
Supporting young people thorough a partner-led approach 
4.71 The evidence emerging from this study suggests that one model of supporting young 
people through investigations is via what we have termed a ‘partner-led approach’. In 
this approach, the police rely almost exclusively on partner agencies to deliver the 
necessary support to young people throughout their journey through the criminal justice 
system. This approach was observed in only one of the eight study forces – Force H – 
where there are multiple CSE teams serving the force population. The model recognises 
that partner agency professionals are best placed to support young people, allowing the 
investigators to get on with the business of detection and prosecution:  
Most of it [supporting young people] is done not by the police… so we use our social 
workers, our child support workers, our parent workers to do all the stuff that the 
police ought to be doing, but it leaves us completely free to concentrate on 
prosecution, especially at court. So, they’ll [young people] be prepared and keep 
going all the way through the court, which can take months as you know, and then 
once they get to court they will be accompanied to court. (H8-1)  
4.72 This same respondent was confident that their success in court cases entirely rested on 
the work that the partner agencies do with young people:  
If we have prosecuted, every single one [young person] has gone to court and turned 
up at court and if necessary given evidence at court… every one. (F8-1)  
4.73 In response to a question on what was behind this success, this participant said:  
Because we don’t do it, our partners do it. (F8-1) 
Supporting young people through a multi-agency approach  
4.74 Another approach evidenced in interviews with police participants is a ‘multi-agency’ 
approach, in which police support young people alongside partner agencies.   
4.75 In Force B (Model 2) whose CSE team is characterised as a specialist victim support 
unit, specialist CSE officers provide support for young people:  
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That’s our job so we work with them [young people] all the time. This unit is set up 
predominantly to work with and support high risk victims of CSE so I’d say we do 
that, it’s our day-to-day job. We have people in this team who are chosen because 
that’s what they’re good at, they’ve worked on child abuse investigation teams, 
they’re experienced child interviewers so I would say we are good at that because 
that’s the skill of the team. (B2-3)    
4.76 Officers in this team have the time to engage with and support young people, but they 
also recognise the value of partner agencies and work closely with them:  
We have the time to engage with them (the young people), the other teams (the 
investigative teams) don’t… We have an opportunity to go back, build a rapport, 
either us or it’s done through Social Services, (a charity), whoever they engage best 
with and over time gain their trust and that’s what leads to them eventually making 
disclosures. (B2-3)  
4.77 Similarly, in Force C (Model 3) (whose CSE team is responsible only for prevention and 
analysis, not investigation or victim support), there appears to be a more integrated and 
joint approach to supporting young people. Child abuse teams with responsibility for a 
case will work with an embedded specialist child iIndependent sexual violence advisor 
(ISVA) or with a local charity with whom there is a strategic relationship:  
We also have [charity] workers, so they won’t work with either/or… The [charity] 
worker may well hand them over to the ISVA or the [charity] worker may keep hold of 
them and support them instead if they have formed that relationship. (C2-1)  
4.78 Force D (with multiple, regionally-based CSE teams) has embedded ‘victim teams’ 
within the CSE teams but works flexibly and takes advice from trusted professionals as 
to the level and length of support they provide to young people:  
 
We’ve given a commitment that we will support victims throughout the process and 
beyond, until there is a professional opinion that says we shouldn’t engage with them 
any longer… We have a dedicated victim team officer… who will have the 
responsibility for engagement with that person in terms of establishing rapport once 
we’ve been introduced by the trusted person… Thereafter we remain in contact with 
that person until they are happy that we no longer need to or until we’ve got a 
professional opinion that says, ‘Actually the best strategy now post trial is to withdraw 
police support and leave that to the mental health professionals, social workers, 
whatever that might be’. (D4-2) 
 
4.79 This respondent explained that they may remain involved after the court process if it is 
appropriate and beneficial for the young person.  
 
There’s no one size fits all and it was driven by what the young person wants, but 
also what professionals who are responsible for their care think is the best thing (D4-
2).   
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Supporting young people through a police-led approach 
4.80 This approach refers to a model where responsibility for supporting young people is 
firmly located with the police. This does not preclude their engagement with relevant 
partner agencies or specialist services in the force area which may be best placed to 
support young people, but the strategy of involving partner agencies appeared to be 
more ad hoc than consistently or strategically applied. Four forces reflected this 
approach.  
4.81 In response to a question about whether or not the force works with community groups 
to support young people, one respondent said:  
We have done but it’s not a case of us working with them… they have supported 
young people. I’m thinking there’s some church youth clubs in [city] and some of the 
youth workers have helped with young people’s disclosures and stuff. So they’ve 
worked with us in that way, but that seems to be very much on an individual young 
person basis rather than us working with them independently I guess. (E5-1)  
4.82 In relation to local voluntary specialist agencies, the respondent continued:  
Sometimes… I’ve done visits with the lady from the [charity] and things like that. If 
they’ve got a good relationship with them then yeah. (E5-1)  
4.83 One participant similarly described a focus on police-led responsibility for working with 
young people through an investigation: 
I think we’re pretty good at it to be honest. They build up a rapport with the OIC 
[Officer in Charge] generally, and that OIC would keep them updated throughout the 
whole process, they wouldn’t just charge and then forget them, and then leave it for 
victim support. And quite often, they [the young person] would ask for the same 
officer to deal with them when they come back. So it is really good. (F6-1) 
4.84 In Force G (Model 4, which has no specialist CSE team), the overarching ‘omni-
competent’ policing approach means that at the outset, it is expected that officers will 
work as needed with young people. However, the force is piloting a new role: a specialist 
CSE-trained officer who can work alongside investigating officers to develop a 
relationship with young people:  
 
We’ve developed a [CSE specialist role] so that we can allocate that officer  – 
perhaps if he’s got a victim that’s not engaging, which is often the way with CSE. So 
that [CSE specialist] will be allocated to building a relationship of trust with that 
particular victim to enable them, perhaps at a later stage, they will say ‘actually yes, 
now I’m happy to talk to you and provide an ABE’. (G7-1)  
 
4.85 Similarly to other forces, this force will draw on the support of partner agencies where 
relevant, but unlike the partner-led or multi-agency approaches, this appears to be done 
on a more ad hoc, as needed basis.  
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4.86 Finally, a force characterising Model 1 is currently in the process of changing its 
approach to supporting young people through the commissioning of a new victim 
support service. Up to the point of interview, however, the police’s role in supporting 
young people was strategically developed to ensure the police were taking responsibility 
for supporting victims and only using specialist partner agencies to ‘fill the gaps’, as the 
following two quotations (by the same participant) illustrate:  
We had an initial plan when we set this strategy up that we would have direct input 
with young people. It’s proven difficult to actually do that because there’s so many 
care packages around them and some of the work that social care are doing, they 
didn’t want us really dealing directly with young people so we’re kind of one step 
away in those terms. That has proved to be difficult and not something that social 
care want. I’d say [the other] division, that is a lot different… there is a lot more direct 
work with young people. (A1-2)   
What I would say is that they do use those specialists and other agencies that are 
available to them to cover some of the gaps in support… we are in the beginning... a 
completely newly commissioned service around victim support so, that’s yet to be 
seen how that changes and improves. (A1-2)  
4.87 This quotation underlines how approaches to supporting young people may be different 
even within the same force, perhaps belying a tension between police and partner 
agencies in different locales. It also demonstrates the changing nature of these 
approaches and shows that, despite the challenges in supporting young people within 
the context of a complex crime, officers are grappling with an acknowledged need to 
work with and support young people.  
4.88 There was clear acknowledgement amongst participants that supporting young people 
through investigations is complex, time consuming and resource intensive:  
We could always do better. More time and resources to be able to look after them 
[young people] better… that means even when they’re not returning our phone calls, 
don’t want to talk to us, we have to go to them… They don’t want us to have their 
phone, they want their phone back... we could probably do with more time and 
resources to perhaps fast track their phones, give them their phone so we’re not 
upsetting them… because that’s what we’re struggling with at the moment. A lot of 
the time, they’re not wanting to come to us, they’re not wanting to keep 
appointments, they don’t want to talk to us when we get there, they don’t want to stay 
in when we want them to be in, you know, it’s time, energy and effort to try and meet 
them on their own terms, when they want us to go there, not when we want to be 
there and that’s kind of the struggle. (G2-1)  
Good practice principles in supporting young people  
4.89 Despite the challenges noted above in this complex area of work, participants talked 
about a range of things they were doing to improve the support of children and young 
people through this process. The table below lists, in the first column, the) Department 
for Education practice guidance principles for working with CSE victims. The second 
column highlights some of the things that participants told us they were doing to support 
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young people, and these are mapped against the principles. We did not specifically ask 
participants about each of these principles and how they manifest in their work, therefore 
this table may only provide a partial picture. (DfE, 2017) 
 
 
Table 4: Positive practice examples of supporting young people emerging from 
interviews with police  
 
Guidance principles Positive practice examples 
Working in the absence 
of disclosure 
Allowing the young person to talk at their own pace 
Using a range of disruption measures to safeguard  
Inclusive and accessible 
non-discriminatory 
practice 
Being well equipped with aids to assist in interviews 
Empathetic and non-
judgmental practice 
Being unassuming 
Unconditional support Use of a specialist child ISVA 
Use of a specialist CSE engagement officer 
 
A consistent approach to 
building relationships 
Building up rapport over time 
Maintaining contact and keeping young people informed 
Ensuring that a consistent officer works with the young 
person, where possible 
A CSE contract created which provides details of the 
officer, what the police said they would do, how often they 
will update the young person/family and signposting to 
supportive agencies 
Joint visits with partner agencies  
Most specialist CSE officers working with young people 
said they do not wear uniforms when meeting the young 
person 
 
Holistic response Drawing on all available partner information to understand 
the range of vulnerabilities present for a young person 
Good links with early help workers 
Knowing what specialist and supportive services are in the 
local area, and signposting to these 
 
A resilience and 
strength-based approach 
No evidence in the interviews in relation to this principle 
Understanding the 
perspective of the child 
No evidence in the interviews in relation to this principle 
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Engaging young people 
in decision making 
No evidence in the interviews in relation to this principle 
Engaging parents/carers 
as protective partners 
Working with local services to provide support to parents/ 
carers 
Understanding the 
impact of trauma 
Recognising that the investigative process mirrors the 
grooming process 
Providing a separate, anonymous, comfortable location for 
victim interviews and appointments 
 
Recognition of the long 
term, non-linear nature of 
recovery 
No evidence in the interviews in relation to this principle 
Working with risk No evidence in the interviews in relation to this principle 
Recognising the impact 
of engagement with the 
criminal justice system 
and supporting young 
people around this 
Use of child advocates for court 
Adhering to the Victim’s Code 
Use of specialist officers to provide advocacy and support 
to young people through the process 
Understanding the 
importance of endings 
Maintaining contact following the court outcome (where 
appropriate and with careful consideration and advice 
from supportive professionals) 
Carefully considering an exit strategy 
 
  
4.90 It is notable that some of the discourse used by police participants, without any 
prompting, reflected good practice principles for working with young people, as the table 
above demonstrates. Not all of the principles were reflected but these findings suggest 
that, at the very least, officers working with CSE are demonstrating an  awareness of 
good principles of working with young people and these are being translated into direct 
practice as they have described.   
Summary 
 
4.91 Participants across all eight forces recognised the complexity of working with victims of 
CSE. There was clear acknowledgement that victims do not always disclose, that they 
require support and attention and that the process of supporting young people takes 
time. While respondents in all eight forces described slightly different models or 
approaches to supporting young people, it was evident that forces are grappling with the 
issue and testing out different approaches.   
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4.92 Those forces demonstrating a police-led approach to working with young people would 
benefit from developing a robust strategy to formalise the involvement of partner 
agencies. Ad hoc approaches are likely to result in unequal support for young people 
and may not result in the best experience for them. Principles of working with young 
people tell us that consistency is important. Lacking a systematic approach to 
partnership with other local agencies may mean that young people fail to experience a 
continuity in support.    
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Section 5: Recommendations  
Taking the findings into consideration, we recommend that: 
5.1 The findings and summary points from this work are mapped against the new police 
Vulnerability Action Plan to protect vulnerable children, including those affected by CSE. 
This would include the police team, under the National Lead for Child Protection and 
Abuse Investigation, working with research project leads to ensure findings are fully 
mapped against the Vulnerability Action Plan and fed into training initiatives arising from 
it. 
 
5.2 The National Lead for Child Protection and Abuse Investigation organises an event or 
open transparent process for CSE police leads to consider the findings from this report, 
specifically in relation to models of policing that support: 
 
 information sharing 
 appropriate resourcing and structure 
 communication between staff within forces and between forces and external partners 
 engagement with the Crown Prosecution Service, and 
 supporting children and young people affected by CSE.  
 
5.3 The CPS improve their recording of CSE cases (perhaps via a similar flagging system to 
that used by the police) and work towards matching CPS records with police records in 
order to better track CSE prosecutions.  
 
5.4 Individual police forces draw on findings from this report to ‘map’ their response to CSE 
and to use summary lessons learned to inform their developing practice.  
 
5.5 The College of Policing meet with the researchers to clarify how findings from this report 
can be incorporated into training, staff development programmes and refreshing 
guidance such as the Authorised Professional Practice for CSE. 
 
5.6 The CSA Centre of Expertise, the National Response Unit and the College of Policing 
work together to support the production of a briefing or guidance paper for police, 
drawing on these findings, specifically to address the absence of guidance on ‘disruption’ 
of potential offenders. It is important that this new guidance recognises that these are 
difficult, entrenched problems and embraces the complexity of the issues involved.  
 
5.7 A full dissemination strategy is developed by the International Centre and the National 
Lead for Child Abuse and Investigation. This dissemination strategy needs to include  
 
5.7.1 an event with children and young people affected by CSE to enable them to 
comment on and address questions of young people’s engagement in police-
led activities, representation of the young person’s voice, and future 
dissemination of findings of this research. This could be initiated through the 
International Centre’s Young Researchers Advisory Panel in the first instance 
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but could also make links with the NPCC Lead for Children and Young 
People.  
 
5. 7.2 Presentation of findings at the next relevant national police conference(s), other 
professional agency conferences, and at national and international academic 
conferences. Presentations to include those by representatives from the 
Young Researchers Advisory Panel who have worked on this research 
project.  
5. 7.3 Joint publications between International Centre researchers, police colleagues 
who have participated in this research and the Young Researchers Advisory 
Panel in police and academic journals  
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APPENDIX: CSE Police Recorded Crime data obtained 
from CSE Regional Analysts 
The police recorded crime data for the eight study forces used in this report was obtained 
from the office of Chief Constable Simon Bailey (the NPCC Lead for CPAI). The data was 
compiled by the regional CSE analysts who extracted CSE crimes from individual force data 
systems to produce regional problem profiles. These profiles have allowed the production of 
a new national picture of CSE in England and Wales. A senior analyst in Chief Constable 
Bailey’s team sought permission from the study forces to share the data with our research 
team and all granted consent on condition of anonymity. This Appendix document describes 
the nature and limitations of the data. The descriptions and associated limitations were 
drawn from unpublished regional problem profiles.  
Description of data Associated limitations and 
implications for this research 
Regional CSE analysts requested all crimes 
considered to be CSE related from individual 
forces in their regions. Given the wide variation 
in local forces’ IT systems, flagging practices 
and stage of flagging implementation, forces 
were asked to provide their ‘best data’. In some 
cases this was through crimes flagged as CSE 
where forces were regularly using this method. 
In other cases, where flagging was not yet being 
used or there were concerns about the 
consistent application of flagging, forces 
consulted spreadsheets which provided further 
information on CSE crimes or they carried out 
manual checks of their systems.  
 
The variation in local forces’ IT systems, 
flagging practices and stage of flagging 
implementation imposes significant 
limitations on our ability to directly 
compare data across the eight study 
forces.  
 
There is still no national standard for CSE 
flagging application, and thus there is 
likely to be both over- and under-use of 
flags in the data sets.   
 
The datasets are also highly likely to 
include duplication in figures as a result of 
victims engaging with multiple agencies 
(and therefore duplication of reporting 
may have occurred).  
 
The data used in this report relates to ‘offline’ 
CSE crimes. In other words, CSE regional 
analysts obtained data from individual forces on 
CSE crimes where there was an element of 
contact between victim and perpetrator. CSE 
crimes which remained online only were omitted 
Given the focus of the data on contact 
offences, the data does not show the full 
picture of CSE police recorded data.  
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from the data sets.  
 
The dataset only includes CSE crimes recorded 
or flagged, omitting CSE incidents (reported 
incidents not yet classified as a crime). 
 
The data does not allow an analysis of 
the broader picture of reporting in relation 
to CSE given the omission of CSE 
incidents.  
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